Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 de9551cb55ec7515…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

17.5 KB Created: 2023-06-30 10:25:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 0645c8287be23a2f83c68797ed6afb38 SHA-1: 66e1723877faffc58975ae88efccd89c5f4aaee4 SHA-256: de9551cb55ec7515ea71b124dfea3ca609fe0442265d247fb3d744546770ed96
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The OOXML document contains a VBA project with a Document_Open macro, which is a common technique for initial execution. This macro utilizes the Shell() function, indicating an intent to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of a long encoded blob within the extracted artifacts further supports this, suggesting obfuscation of malicious code. No specific family could be identified, but the execution chain is clear.

Heuristics 5

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
fd714746946cffeec10d8b25ffd44d027025eac353d38747018fc39191cca9ba		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3355 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
8ad1c6c2203db5a78421d8cf96cabf12b9485d31af1a66019bd4f439056047cb		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13824 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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