Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 de65a9bf068b1a1e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

351.2 KB
MD5: 0a540ad3d578e9d57d35fefaeec7afa3 SHA-1: c02966a164da86869571bdee80009ed94d0a3588 SHA-256: de65a9bf068b1a1e39a90fa76354d75caf28d875df8d8550c4f046acd45a21eb
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating automatic linking and an update trigger for activation. This suggests a technique to bypass macro security and execute embedded code. No document body text or scripts were provided, limiting further analysis of the specific payload or lure.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bac.bin
eda5f1f557827c942dfcd9d8df2ec18e9bb918b10fe0cab3244b0358a3fe3715
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBAC 67631 bytes
objdata_01_off0000735b.bin
ccdd1d9515c3b8db0fc401deb44e4f53d4ca100c1fe54f2867b09a13285ec26c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x735B 67604 bytes
objdata_02_off00029944.bin
a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x29944 2632 bytes
objdata_03_off0002aee7.bin
e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2AEE7 12297 bytes