Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 de5f37fe855c75d6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

59.6 KB Created: 2020-10-26 02:28:33 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-12-26
MD5: f0b79d7dfe02cb8e9abfdb844c49a574 SHA-1: 310e7e742a9252cbd4412fcee58a5afc06c0102a SHA-256: de5f37fe855c75d6a698bc10f1e37897b28ad7cb90e4604e6308bf8ec6281c30
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/123?keyword=clinical+infectious+diseases+textbook+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366365/normal_5f8d43dd4dabc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379615/normal_5f950ce4360f2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4380694/normal_5f8bd336e8c92.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4408333/normal_5f9447c05588b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367275/normal_5f87543a2d623.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4384836/normal_5f91ecd979192.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366017/normal_5f873a8d9f436.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vikumeniwexawud.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969440/2545999.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dopuxaponaxu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695391/5ed105f152d8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sirawomaperuli.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398091/wurixapuger.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://moxitasa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454719/74cef76d27b2ad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mokitigek.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606839/musux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://laxuruvu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131482832/jopepifafusar_derol_temevinik_zajuvoxo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kidunaxu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437100/muninasudamenepuzi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000aa3c.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000aa3c.bin)
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0497/5198/2233/files/kakeso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/2314/5896/files/1-1_points_lines_and_planes_worksheet_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0298/5621/files/maytag_ensignia_washing_machine_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0268/7628/1031/files/pimesu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6598f7bb-1441-459e-8b5d-ba3f42c062a4/70217366849.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000aa3c.bin)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000aa3c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAA3C 5228 bytes
SHA-256: 71e45eac76dd5fad9bf08a13518a06c0fc79823da8d1380eb4c61cd967ef1087
font_01_sfnt_off0000bc10.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBC10 10844 bytes
SHA-256: 4ac86e8068877b32f99c3ea6cac6af61b2b4d90afcef6f752b168b25162dc365