Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 de3c3457a0cce8f2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

88.4 KB Created: 2021-10-06 05:32:01 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-25
MD5: 969a14940d88fd1e492f19e5efcf4518 SHA-1: 42daf489ed3de17fac029e94270fd468c188fb0d SHA-256: de3c3457a0cce8f2dc55010425d4a6b4d79a7631d3e15f3414404c0e120c902e
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is a PDF containing embedded JavaScript, which is a common vector for malicious activity. Heuristics indicate it functions as a link farm, directing users to compromised WordPress upload storage and other disposable hosting sites. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9976

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://floridainvestment.cz/files/file/39520502981.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://hatowo.com/app/webroot/uploads/files/97272363913.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://md-bud.pl/szklo/photos/file/tufaxetugosukavi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bizimpin.com/calisma2/files/uploads/89715799809.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://technoauto.jp/js/upload/files/31736663861.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://geologicatoscana.eu/userfiles/files/winigobaba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sistersaviopublicschool.com/userfiles/file/6440041872.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cancunday.com/travela/img/files/81095045006.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://newtrichur.com/userfiles/file/nutefi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vaonhaphatphap.com/images/uploads/files/penopo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://acril.ru/ufiles/files/56469246188.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hadlowsecurityshutters.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5e0dcbb977cfd2cf1cc75ba2b687d52e/nuxoxutete.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://novsport.com/content/File/simufulire.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hattingtoemrerogsnedker.dk/userfiles/file/92121803163.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://99hospitalitygroup.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/6542578443.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://b-solutions.net/userfiles/file/zesavafopuxidiramofawi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://demo-calson.garment-pro.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/22461652388.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://braintradingbcn.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6e396ec55818c899b28a17561379df0e/25871175071.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://abwlanham.com/uploads/files/voziputa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://yakin-surewin.com/media/file/88660337406.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hylyt.co/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/79646a35217896af91da95cf922534a8/denasuxulo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ldoris.com/upfile/files/20210914061932.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nano-vip.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zepudomim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=who+are+the+gods+of+warPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f20a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF20A 19396 bytes
SHA-256: db8137d70fe1b51b4912117289f593acf86f14f4343ad7367ad9f32d30a5a030
font_01_sfnt_off000123f0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x123F0 10472 bytes
SHA-256: 6fed1950ff6737dde353306ce1946d494a2f5d7e2872cfe14337ce17bf78a88b
font_02_sfnt_off00013bc5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13BC5 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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