Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 de04a7714147200c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

18.2 KB
MD5: c38b929e08fbfedfdbbbc21821f12a94 SHA-1: 8545b557eb859ab66ddba25d983a46aab41f2c2b SHA-256: de04a7714147200cc71bb568517f0faefc2a339586dac075004bef8b2ffdc6a5
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates an attempt to automatically activate the embedded object upon opening. This strongly suggests the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to download and execute a secondary payload, likely via a mechanism not fully detailed in the static analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000163a.bin
8cccc173ef3a76415945809f663d3c8ce3dad34d609129a911d10b1211144fcc
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x163A 1605 bytes