Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dde4a23853620186…

MALICIOUS

PDF

107.7 KB Created: 2021-02-15 08:11:25 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 48b7e96065c80c60de17862c8b63d5cb SHA-1: 52bf9d41f1d75ef502ed6d852d46862067465f5f SHA-256: dde4a2385362018654d241cf633ee8822803f20dce1fe45671f44d7a1dd508d9
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document functions as a link farm, directing users to numerous external PDF files hosted on disposable domains and services like Weebly and sqhk.co. The heuristic firings indicate a deliberate attempt to create a large number of SEO-optimized links, likely for malicious purposes such as phishing or distributing further malware. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jacksth.ru/123?utm_term=what+natural+resources+are+plentiful+in+brazil PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kepebeso/hhVsWF2/ganiveguju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vopupevomate/b2Yieia/sin_pin_code_number.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gefimiwotux/qm2kjjn/thumbelina_toad_lady.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kigatuxusim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135305206/1397719.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pivamuwonojazop.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969183/f3724d238.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kerozusokenizil.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383247/724645.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tonalemeketav.66ghz.com/peak_performance_hoodie_gul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sawuwirepugasup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969548/feweli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pelotuwew/3ibLYhh/baseball_9_apk_mod_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nugilura.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135317706/da960b82196ac.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/sezogitov/gghaijm/31270733261.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wexoxunesixu.iblogger.org/40917124063.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mawesenasijoser/alabama_power_report_outage_phone_number.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00015b07.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15B07 5188 bytes
SHA-256: 5717a37ec381a778fb44624aa56a9465f0be7380d6d784d867488d3fa7162743
font_01_sfnt_off00016cac.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16CAC 10888 bytes
SHA-256: 1925e2d7d8a4117eebcbbd3a236412d2304436a8405bd7b6e5760b070b991550
font_02_sfnt_off0001919e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1919E 4324 bytes
SHA-256: cd94ef65598b1866d0653cdd88243d989fd81359c0e770c2d3a4858f1c2f6d34

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