Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ddc2ef970d646e52…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

37.5 KB Created: 1999-02-08 09:24:15 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: 45e45d56b1e666e5569ea93751616536 SHA-1: ee7d0da359a13d77f1cb4a1a1c984b1169b42537 SHA-256: ddc2ef970d646e524328bc09bf54bb50500516c2dc93b39caebb7ac18f4de9c8
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is identified as a malicious Microsoft Excel document. Heuristics indicate suspicious OLE structures, including a large unaccounted-for region and empty streams, suggesting an attempt to obfuscate or hide malicious content. The presence of embedded artifacts further supports a malicious intent, likely related to delivering a secondary payload or exploiting vulnerabilities. The document body contains repetitive, non-sensical text, which is common in obfuscated malicious documents.

Heuristics 3

  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 29,158 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 29,158 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off0000241a.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x241A 29158 bytes
SHA-256: 825e653d88694defa98112029946a19646b9f7ac594a422ecc68deb0515d0462

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