Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ddae248646a30258…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.8 KB Created: 2021-05-04 13:02:33 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 33bf98aff3b473e7e73abf22910529f3 SHA-1: b90ff7d72de723df9e6e21f5972801cc068cc4ca SHA-256: ddae248646a3025805aeebc5e3c59d0d8275163c39798975555ff2bf44419d82
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It functions as a link farm, containing numerous external URIs pointing to various PDF files hosted on disposable domains. The primary purpose appears to be directing users to potentially malicious content, possibly for phishing or malware delivery, rather than providing any legitimate information.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jacksth.ru/strik?utm_term=java+8+stream+foreach+call+method
    • https://burekanokem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131069897/7405313.pdf
    • https://pusotovoxidelo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637553/tedujigatiwa_toxak_xolurukalebo_tugaxin.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/purorelaz/hcRiWQj/war_of_independence_1857_notes.pdf
    • https://rulafowobunafo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135391395/vobuzevif_netakuvobug_newefukud.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/morureju/jjhucjg/lukavadumadugimaporat.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/purorenutuw/ejdGHtZ/vetunetidure.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4478664/normal_60213fda8ec2b.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4470703/normal_5fd08c34f2118.pdf
    • https://mirinojasuri.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134588432/zifexifovolinukizeb.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/niserutom/vRjb1SM/ziruse.pdf
    • https://tulixepatezapik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/9/134902644/ca6d945d3fc2df.pdf
    • https://komimarokobak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134604519/0c765392.pdf
    • https://nukivobiwej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134016752/davek-mavizebijupade-pogapezom.pdf
    • https://paxobafu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134697986/f35d63ef887d0f2.pdf
    • https://wafumaxa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/4/135400811/kodexetalaxetu.pdf
    • https://vujufosidomo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131482916/7d37b4f69c.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4451574/normal_604b35b50b822.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vesotadenogo/oDhichi/ms_word_colour_codes.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4446283/normal_5ff11f43988c9.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4411937/normal_6060818436af5.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dc53.bin
5166f401ca70cb0023e0da740473427b6eab027324d05e9203b1e892ba311632		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC53 5504 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000eee7.bin
82110365d19ca7420bbb6dd5af1315b4b15b368eef2d9356afc5afd255612535		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEEE7 10136 bytes

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