Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dd806e208bd9e439…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.3 KB Created: 2021-06-29 22:27:26 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-23
MD5: ddee2ccdf2039a15cbf912435eeda848 SHA-1: a72017dea67ccb152bd90d1841d0264436e6d5fa SHA-256: dd806e208bd9e4399dc4bba618de1a1f15dc4876543875cfedf083dc2fe1038a
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains multiple heuristics indicating malicious intent, including a high-severity ML classifier flagging it as malicious and a ClamAV detection for 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan'. It also features a brand impersonation lure for Apple, directing users to a link farm with disposable hosting and compromised CMS uploads. The presence of a download button lure further supports the phishing attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9952

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=get+free+gems+lords+mobile.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://bloomlight.pl/_bloom/file/89477189281.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://cageart.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607e458380a80---xeronusujixiloxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://infoenergie-loire.org/userfiles/file/3098273432.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zjpjxt.cn/upload/uploadfile/file/rizelada.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aryaayur.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608caca6040a0---18757221300.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://walkandsmile.com/userfiles/file/31956263429.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vieclamkinhdoanh247.com/upload/files/fewavedixujusisizixo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://shining4u.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5f6c1865cb26a90a400c803d5033be47/kofam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://artistalexanderkanevskyroyalshakespeareglobetheatrelondon.com/clientMedia/file/mosax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bularz-auto.pl/images/userfiles/file/vuvevetezefipamitipi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://noukos.gr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a65335e78c2---91141849259.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://stef-nancy.fr/upload/document/mirudobaliniweg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://webtraffic.ch/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/nj0lqjnp9pit2ojmfvl08ght5m/tapofovevedefumuse.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ed-web.cz/userfilesfile/foduxinoxapobulonefut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.c2commercial.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/73052d4e5b4154e48cf988d2508be6c0/jafezerele.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nedirajtebosnu.net/userfiles/file/79233756183.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.uppld.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160768449b9781---mixozizebitumexegulinudu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://joyfool.art/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7cedf46d22defd5c207d03f5479e4efa/43079512656.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pabausa.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cd6395e4843---fufuvanubevi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://getadoc.in/ckfinder/userfiles/files/josomabomosab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://soft-pro.hr/upload/datoteke/72844002392.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://angelescare.com/userfiles/file/gekor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ludifrance.fr/userfiles/file/98144406380.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=get+free+gems+lords+mobilePDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ee7c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE7C 10608 bytes
SHA-256: 63df6edc7fa4f72c757af76846789e22b5e569fbb782b01ac5e289567ca738cc
font_01_sfnt_off00010685.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10685 18000 bytes
SHA-256: e5980a801a382dd8fc4ebf2e51d9b95fff120e824beaa6fe1a24b66d6c2dbf36
font_02_sfnt_off00013436.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13436 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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