RTF malware analysis — malicious · dd7893c7eed9662f

MALICIOUS

RTF

92.1 KB First seen: 2024-08-01

MD5: db344140e0f39ca7e7d5ff70a64f007a SHA-1: dceb93f2c1a589c034fd6c66dcfce5e12e75b354 SHA-256: dd7893c7eed9662f479225efff35609cf555c810c5cb0b1e316af2b2e88131ac

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that exploits a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR). The ".objupdate" directive forces the OLE object to activate, likely triggering the download and execution of a secondary payload. The presence of RTF-specific heuristics indicates a classic exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001057.bin` `bad1eeb34b851f1e4b97e633d134fc1f175d9d4b75d113cf8bac18a502f3681c`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1057	1976 bytes

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