Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dd58e937b73b1757…

MALICIOUS

PDF

101.2 KB Created: 2021-01-08 15:48:45 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-16
MD5: 46d439d7ec9f01538597fe3a2232ca5c SHA-1: 4f1d2748193387c118089741c071423dd6941c30 SHA-256: dd58e937b73b1757f69fa016c45196b261d2ad5a970c8a8455c09900f8954573
186 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, identified as a link farm, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate maliciousness. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs point towards a malicious intent to redirect users to potentially harmful sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffnew.ru/123?utm_term=colleen+marshall+wikipedia PDF link annotation
    • https://bovuzujavus.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135326818/8938540.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rizibibaruf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135383358/4195298.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4450037/normal_5fd780f5b91cd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4476443/normal_5faaa32bd04b8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372696/normal_5fd27ca469cf4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4384308/normal_5ff27209aa23d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tenipimip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134042327/9673761.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4390081/normal_5f9ed0c73c2f3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tekegalesi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740489/2882b83f81.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zazewefagawi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776698/logapixufow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4450511/normal_5fe645cbd5e98.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://duvupobilalef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134630448/f0e24e04ac828.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://biteledazuxol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134315761/91560f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fupanabivote/41366436893.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00014173.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14173 5084 bytes
SHA-256: 3280475b0cb7f7e76cd370d02e317cfe9cbbc604f369ab4b17ac4c7a0e29fcad
font_01_sfnt_off0001528e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1528E 11720 bytes
SHA-256: 57cc560625d1f3d4797a751ef108724fc20198a78a11ca4eb3f6ff736dcc9ff6
font_02_sfnt_off000179bf.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x179BF 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 05d2457133b820fa77aa358e30e9acfbad3f04c46ced9a37296d9311117db176

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