Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dd2c94bf4e340ab7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.7 KB Created: 2020-11-01 05:46:14 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-01-10
MD5: 5f38863759fdf77a46119211b867c6cc SHA-1: ecdd08e7f1cf43674420af9563123d0b551d0699 SHA-256: dd2c94bf4e340ab762842f8146b150e3d9ad632a355acaa197086ceb31b89c89
204 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) or Microsoft license-boilerplate documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/aws?keyword=the+signal+fire+poe In PDF document text
    • https://nikokitigo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134500207/tefinujub_kafojob_povevuwi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bofufawikifof.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235483/b582645b0b25d2a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pasuliwipo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452824/2895765764.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365662/normal_5f87d6b2a8b08.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zukamukenipebo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380388/mazetudutawagum-dolod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guratebiliwabop.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682790/nukazos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4387031/normal_5f9c43f7f1daf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367278/normal_5f873cac0286f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nipaxibovaj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379211/913a3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rizidapovo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134316848/2460644.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ketawajizaw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134528489/wunog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4386073/normal_5f9a7a50cafec.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jinunezig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134308797/d16c55ea52d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006177.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006177.bin)
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In extracted file (font_02_sfnt_off00009801.bin)
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0500/2467/7565/files/how_long_did_noah_live_in_islam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006177.bin)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006177.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6177 4820 bytes
SHA-256: 3bc5c21a3c52d50ae497ad0515723927b4a57c99af13ee0166ed0f976cf8b160
font_01_sfnt_off000071c1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x71C1 11296 bytes
SHA-256: 72391be72ac6c85010a1f77522b3ab837bedebba8ee6e5912d5f776053828828
font_02_sfnt_off00009801.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9801 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 0d0f64e27578eb124b8bc81c7eceacdd166e22eddd95c81328e9fbd7de2a6333