Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dd1f972096743666…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.0 KB Created: 2020-11-08 01:32:05 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: 16e949c29fe6d25ef450ead486baa816 SHA-1: 4bfe9551cdf1c766df0c7d91e4e934da789c2913 SHA-256: dd1f97209674366634075b378aa142114e8f5b9ffcfa099122478e5b2e44843c
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable hosting, and one specifically to a known malicious redirector. The document body text, though partially obfuscated, includes a URL that matches the malicious redirector, suggesting an attempt to trick users into clicking through to malicious content. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/123?keyword=volusia+county+warrants+for+arrest In PDF document text
    • https://xosotujusosevo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134377620/2287957.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kodowogokilikid.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134466607/4796825.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jigaxamika.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134610035/e62563fd6e254e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374840/normal_5f8ca7f8a7089.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nubojubixuxo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131410311/5090571.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368505/normal_5fa33c7f224c8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sebonegipuwi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134108682/29c30c9a253.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sudigosapo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134456465/7142456.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lezunodukulo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134341823/jekolozi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lunojol/internal_control_policies_and_procedures_have_limitations_including.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mafaxivovel.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/7346655750.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://falikajudepi.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/rasemuvix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://widimupek.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/79724888514.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sevuropigo.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/kexiwozopapukis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/garorowa/moto_rush_2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pifakimep.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/fododuxuxinoni.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zirojopemup/jilusawosid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008794.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8794 5036 bytes
SHA-256: 9e15ccd6f0456c94af8e99b02a96c655e5f81b5803f6bbd8892f177223160245
font_01_sfnt_off000098db.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x98DB 11768 bytes
SHA-256: 791c0921fd24511d3f166146cbe9781629332846f103aa078b74240034eff68f

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