Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dd0fa210d9e1a395…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

21.4 KB
MD5: ea0205fb5d4127d7b3a3c132691662a0 SHA-1: 585dd25dc68ecca99f396e3474d05c05b014b636 SHA-256: dd0fa210d9e1a3955b1e37d04164a5c72900192f74f2d04b922af72c4b22c6e5
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor vulnerabilities. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" fields strongly suggests the exploitation of a known Equation Editor flaw, likely CVE-2017-11882, to achieve arbitrary code execution. This is a common delivery mechanism for malware.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000125b.bin
d7b83bbf3ace0d4763c91b3cc42e534eca3734965f0ec497aa217cb29cce6e24
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x125B 1726 bytes