Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dcfd0195dac36cc1…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

327.6 KB Created: 2021-05-15 10:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 0df73c0cbe5dd0e2aef210d73c956d77 SHA-1: d9dbdb481342312e17250319da8ad975d2280627 SHA-256: dcfd0195dac36cc1d0747a6b40293e07ca1d174047f5267bee474afc4d565fb7
69 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object, identified as a potentially risky file type (jar extension). Static triage also flagged a suspicious extracted artifact. No document body text was available for content analysis. The embedded OLE object is the primary indicator of malicious intent, likely serving as a dropper for further malicious payloads.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — context-specific rules above attribute URLs they actually evaluated; this rule lists URLs that were present in the bytes but were not otherwise tied to a specific finding.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
da67add0e035d7323bed48db4cbc5e31a6dc0fa9b593c88460c72844e275eb4e		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 327680 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.98, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
b6d9806fdf5161179dc1da4215acf85429a491dfe6499daf6a5a1f4cce5863a5		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 322783 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
1dbd4c74c4bb8ebdd33d62935e420fad0097e1de4feea11ab4be0db4d78306f1		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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