IcedID — Office (OOXML) / .OLE malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dcfbb405b77d475e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .OLE

69.7 KB Created: 2020-10-14 07:55:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 789f097b48dea86bf73ca937dd837c3a SHA-1: 055f61a604aadfda282cb9afc1d49577e67127d5 SHA-256: dcfbb405b77d475ece5c8ff18820293dc8de93eab3e67c481a3a09a6c28e7591
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

IcedID · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file is identified as malicious by ClamAV with the signature Doc.Downloader.IcedID-87f88705f807f878-9951567-0, indicating the IcedID family. Static analysis revealed the presence of a VBA project with an AutoOpen macro, a common technique for executing malicious code upon document opening. This macro is likely responsible for downloading and executing a second-stage payload, consistent with the behavior of IcedID. No specific URLs were extracted as IOCs, but the ClamAV signature itself serves as a high-confidence indicator.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-87f88705f807f878-9951567-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-87f88705f807f878-9951567-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
8673ea638e960f62a41c4631813876dfc2b018add4a6059be5342bd6b03286c5		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 7399 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
201b002db9fa873d46357e99aae6319f9776329745954a4d2c66e96ae591a5e0		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 37888 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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