Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dcf86e816b98be53…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.02 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-02-07
MD5: cde82ace59727b5d5361188e05fa2666 SHA-1: 286c8341871455ab3e2a8f80a749c41fe8c169cb SHA-256: dcf86e816b98be53bf58186cbfc5c22b36efb1a6a4e41a4b27687795f03290d7
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that is known to be vulnerable to CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code, typically used to download and execute a second-stage payload. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the presence of the vulnerable OLE object is a strong indicator of malicious intent.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
007209d7304b1d0e7b9d8e95f36b8291f60cf43b5c3f81a61097fc2f4231d470
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD018EC695/oLE10nATIve 2152 bytes