Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dcce3c9c4755c9b2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.2 KB Created: 2021-09-20 11:24:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: cf634eb86f177e2e8288e65de32b36d6 SHA-1: 07d0cd12b9aede52377305db91a155e50f29548c SHA-256: dcce3c9c4755c9b25afd53450006e2005f58d0d96deb930da1ecda336d716d70
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file was flagged by ClamAV as a phishing trojan and ML classifiers indicated a high probability of maliciousness. Heuristics identified it as a link farm, with many embedded URLs pointing to potentially compromised websites or disposable hosting, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The document body is heavily obfuscated, but the presence of numerous external URIs and the 'PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM' heuristic strongly indicate a lure to external malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9968

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://consade.com/userfiles/file/winakerewitatolovopigata.pdf
    • https://amezdigital.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bdb587e2aff594a72d739f26d1ea7908/97644336719.pdf
    • http://www.etoiles-recrutement.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16137ebe125cc1---safojovaresaxerujisam.pdf
    • http://aelma.com/sites/default/userfiles/file/tekefiwekel.pdf
    • http://longruiglass.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/20210914_121222.pdf
    • https://xn--22ck6bdp5cach0mc23a.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/gibivex.pdf
    • http://minhanh.com/files/takesezanazabexeza.pdf
    • http://karpzbeldowa.pl/uploads/userfiles/files/benomotofenuvidijuruf.pdf
    • https://holcom-wd.holcom.vn/webroot/img/files/xixilowabod.pdf
    • https://thriveelearning.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d52dc0797e5e260d32fac7dd9beead97/kavunupixalonolejulajadup.pdf
    • http://akcjonariusz.com/UserFiles/file/tedigowetijixif.pdf
    • http://www.stockholmswingallstars.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16145924d7ac8e---ketixeje.pdf
    • http://turhantur.com/turhantur/files/17899837125.pdf
    • http://xn--80age2amlc.xn--80adxhks/pics/images/file/80203494012.pdf
    • https://e-midas.ro/files/file/voxorodagivisej.pdf
    • http://centralcogtc.com/uploads/file/43688967976.pdf
    • https://dolupin.com/calisma2/files/uploads/dorolerige.pdf
    • http://haai.org/upload/file/zawikuved.pdf
    • https://www.xcelsus.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613d962a0ca81---vefodenonidazofexofiwo.pdf
    • http://bwemfjhjk.friend-match.com/upload/files/53956600297.pdf
    • https://dbmotorbrokers.com/userfiles/file/rujagopifutinojopoteg.pdf
    • https://krantiservice.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/dafutar.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+access+sim+contacts+on+android
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d27c.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD27C 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000ea93.bin
9480050cc3e18c14f63712b356b69279e2163b6d7ac59fdb3c84a54b217361c6
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEA93 10560 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000102a4.bin
4544eb6abc10837e7e5d7025f2e5b99f9688ea441bfa83843d2ed6193e25b24c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x102A4 17240 bytes