Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dcc41511485c3673…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.2 KB Created: 2021-08-01 01:21:09 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 19f63d687b78a41f1301c79634db6051 SHA-1: ba5eeeff75e704377c505fd9b8b741c9809aeaaf SHA-256: dcc41511485c3673d4128a3ec88bea2da92c571ef3225687e93cc1cb47ed3c20
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is a PDF containing embedded JavaScript and multiple links to external PDFs hosted on compromised websites. The heuristics indicate a high likelihood of an advance-fee scam lure, suggesting the user is tricked into downloading a further malicious payload. The embedded JavaScript and the nature of the links point towards an attempt to execute further malicious code or redirect the user to a phishing site.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9991

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Advance-fee lottery/parcel scam lure high SE_ADVANCE_FEE_SCAM_LURE
    Document contains lottery/beneficiary or prize language together with large-value draft/funds wording and parcel/courier delivery requirements. This is a classic advance-fee fraud document shape.
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://sterenstein.ru/userfiles/file/56163087778.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://alliance-ltd.com/userfiles/xalegokadiwi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xperion.hu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b2c7d32e5110af4856242fceedec0192/mowalemalamewudepade.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rurisnet.org/images/file/2004914496.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://intelean.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a7eeb215b28---vamesakugip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://brixtontaxi.com/survey/userfiles/files/gaxabapekifalazesegozover.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bascobrunswick.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606e8100c5a9a---10149663276.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lycee-elm.org/userfiles/file/tolepalujadofeti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aimic.com/userfiles/file/seleva.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bentzendesign.se/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16073a03394757---31278939882.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sasalidayanisma.org/uploads/file/woteviwamovupuluvogujopud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sunarnuricomuisvealisverismerkezi.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ndmff66ts9acviijea3cntaq52/zaxaworunisugobusere.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bdaudit.ro/userfiles/file/59738510927.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://amatnieks.com/pictures/image/50247282146.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lawyerupsmart.com/tempimg/file/kasavoxadijexope.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://127.0.0.1/bantraicay/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/43741488133.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://bestbuyfromindia.com/userfiles/file/14828465169.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bilagroup.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608ab4048a101---teter.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ganan10.co.il/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607ba8337daf1---77150838146.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bascobrunswick.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16090b5db233cd---42501864735.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ziepniekkalns.lv/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ba7d6c1bffb---jewobinamadapukekipudozo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dhins.com/testingsites/advantage_aviation/assets/media/file/33999920059.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://prodesign31.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b5bdbf95ae3---74443315279.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/Om9ozkHLxGw/uplcv?utm_term=music+streaming+services+freePDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f205.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF205 20196 bytes
SHA-256: 8ae1a2cddde12507709c46f23b4fe08e9b8a75357a22285959c90450001e19a5
font_01_sfnt_off0001265c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1265C 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00013e73.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13E73 10672 bytes
SHA-256: 8012ff8014b7e2aa09fce8de11f7937ddee6607efb684aa9910e4bc04c055cb3

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