Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dca1af19b476c8cd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.0 KB Created: 2021-02-12 02:40:15 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: 6e14c5f197eac4760d9bf5a4b259428d SHA-1: b6917ea62340e029809cc488d894c7ade0aaba80 SHA-256: dca1af19b476c8cd1e0b84e154a1bb6a3b2c1509ebc5727bb8149ce62c074960
284 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document is classified as malicious and contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on disposable domains or known redirector infrastructure. The heuristic firings indicate it functions as a link farm designed to redirect users to potentially harmful content, likely for phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were extracted, the presence of many suspicious URLs and the ML classification strongly suggest a malicious intent to lead users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image-heavy PDF with invisible link to suspicious domain high PDF_SUSPICIOUS_LINK_LURE
    PDF is a small image-heavy lure with invisible link annotations that send the user to a suspicious high-risk-domain URI. This matches credential-phishing carriers where the visible document is only a prompt and the real collection flow happens on the linked website.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/123?utm_term=ozark+trail+11-person+instant+cabin+with+private+room In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/mewidexe/AihjauU/kumusotofalenirinekizin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pepodefaposuv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/9/135992330/kaxufe-ligozaponepalov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://menudobuwowewil.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134765252/debine-katunogoxozunet-rupitagopamaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mulomaninivoxom.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437045/kijuni.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://putoluvutawubu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437806/nosepedifabusave.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nodokesomizi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134656280/9dedaee5c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bozixezexa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134861503/salika.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mupililoxer.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135302313/40d6ebe9f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4417534/normal_5fd7cddab5b94.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bomazadoxu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134474586/5644993.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ig-supportcenter.xyz/wamokomizefufov0qz7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4377125/normal_5fe6ffb733f23.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4460477/normal_6018648b8104d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zaxefuki.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/2/135299090/tagiwibo-figifasiridonis-jatijiguxebaba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001026b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1026B 5688 bytes
SHA-256: 92918a7c37ac6b0d346dcf6948e0f1d87af756bcfe934cec44a0e1dfad5dbd0c
font_01_sfnt_off000115c6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x115C6 10720 bytes
SHA-256: 7ed71d1d04146d0215f779f3100f39af2afd06e5d6c75bf3615749f397bec984