Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dc843f1cf2fdc0d5…

MALICIOUS

RTF

13.8 KB First seen: 2023-02-16
MD5: 186e56eb43ad334e2c673139a4742616 SHA-1: 161ed2509876a883e4cdf29cca443ef087dd3bff SHA-256: dc843f1cf2fdc0d597c961787f9ccd8e0fb7d5d3fd44e390e420dd2e5be7d1cf
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded OLE object is designed to be activated automatically, likely to trigger the exploit. This suggests the document's primary purpose is to leverage this vulnerability to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000015f3.bin
de906f338e944bdd7d55991eac4f4e795f8224b8272b017598ba56377ddbd380
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x15F3 1834 bytes