Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dc78d5da05d1b91c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.8 KB
MD5: 44a78beef854499a22eb33af1f1ff1cc SHA-1: 5443c6dfb9682edbc6ce9e9244cde6b65a4354b2 SHA-256: dc78d5da05d1b91c6e9f66f8669c862b57757bc105f4ead4f3fabd705625b95d
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to exploit this vulnerability for code execution. This is a common delivery mechanism for various malware families.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000d2.bin
2cab122cbfe2731dc743fa9a58df8dd551491f449ff03f909bd344bf620aab48
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD2 1685 bytes