Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dc65e647a2122b79…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.8 KB Created: 2021-02-23 08:13:51 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-23
MD5: cbba506f25a1235cc5b018d2ce520a17 SHA-1: ca0e4250a29bd9b9827ff997837d85112547ce3a SHA-256: dc65e647a2122b79863d8bc205730a978cc5ff0b62988ed31d4120bb7f777714
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a mass external link farm, with many links pointing to disposable hosting and using UTM parameters, indicating a phishing or malware distribution scheme. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs are indicative of a malicious document designed to redirect users to potentially harmful sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://bologen.ru/strik?utm_term=how+to+wipe+samsung+galaxy+tab+4 PDF link annotation
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4443292/normal_5ff671c156845.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4470533/normal_6016092d29dcc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4410006/normal_60210ef782100.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4405687/normal_603462f8ecb1b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4418984/normal_6012f89f228a7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4500882/normal_60119f84e251e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dedelazixuni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134596723/4599239.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4530846/normal_5fe66d76aa972.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://midagadin.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381693/2759478.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mazaxijav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134488449/goradetakujama-ravev-tuxekupexefin-mudinajupese.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://xaxidos.epizy.com/kemurov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lusegokaves/vanerotopuvamolejupol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jebokizez/bhutto_song_mp4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kuxegu/sugafamubuzevifogiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lomogas/puvegazurero.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mogerokefo.epizy.com/how_to_connect_my_sony_tv_to_bluetooth_speaker.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000da37.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDA37 5492 bytes
SHA-256: 3332a1fd8d0f7ddfa612e6ca5b2e216436816cf833ca777e230f56e5442b13d3
font_01_sfnt_off0000ecf9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xECF9 10768 bytes
SHA-256: 7a9b228f633c6a34d7f6994a0cc951ab52bd34c6cd74ca912ea8c1ddcaa4a81f

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