Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dc57bb2aaacc314e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

121.1 KB Created: 2021-07-26 01:05:02 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-29
MD5: b1b3939c186a31d816318d1e598fb538 SHA-1: 063b301f4dfcba82cfa3208bd04ec6c6e1acd0da SHA-256: dc57bb2aaacc314e1f9b2c589e34890e5ef7d3997577e43b59a10069d1af3c3a
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

This PDF document exhibits multiple indicators of malicious intent, including a high-confidence ML classification and ClamAV detection as a phishing trojan. It leverages a callback lure, instructing the user to call a number, and also contains links to potentially compromised WordPress upload directories. The presence of a 'password-protected archive handoff' heuristic suggests the document is designed to trick users into downloading an encrypted payload, likely to evade initial security scans.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9985

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://northwestpixie-bobs.com/clients/e/e1/e1941a3904c49320334fd90e0ed9e852/File/71449293979.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://www.sunarnuricomuisvealisverismerkezi.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/uk5fbjtmb3o5lc0e4f1dn63pd0/fibenewilejulur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://andlupa.com/userfiles/file/72478733763.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.klpreschool.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609858a633e4a---85172933508.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.ediliziaindustriale.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608550784599e---zixanogevegudagujaramebaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bracyfamilyreunion.com/clients/c/c2/c2db1a97f769835965582c74015c7782/File/41599513455.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mfdesign.hu/files/file/62289771272.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://computerzone.pk/file/favolewomudogajubul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alphaconsultinggroup.us/vpw/images/file/binito.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ural-aiti.ru/admin/ckfinder/userfiles/files/gofumivetunedukurovixeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://krevue.cz/UserFiles/File/fibefulumifepadik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ercrs.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ggjbblp6p3he2ht8d2buld5908/dikorazikasomajaporo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://interface-referencement.com/userfiles/file/buwujabusil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://qualitycountscleaning.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d611064940c840ca1cbaacd2d18cd984/24602927844.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stigstudiotecnico.it/userfiles/files/nagijuwetavoledu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://espicycooking.com/files/file///pezasenijoxibagop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dungcuruamui.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/uc0t7ikp2crkade6orcsaaqjnd/gofodopikorexukokiguj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://atut-biuro.com/uploaded/file/wererejimawumavej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nemeckystrakac.sk/editor_uploads/files/topalodesavaraz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sakitonus.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9e84e9fbf62ff480ef8a0d3ee4a42da2/mifofezosovasafogin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://spoilersmensgolfclub.com/clients/865201/File/54491808903.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://doitsolutions.co/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e4bdc05b7311ee8c4fc43e19b8e2336e/vidawulebufapo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://scarpatti.com/files/5522616445.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.cdscabling.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16076ee0ba098a---88903268428.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/S30rS-6n6vg/uplcv?utm_term=hipaa+security+incident+response+plan+templatePDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001750e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1750E 17840 bytes
SHA-256: b3d4d0b74efb33d2fb980ae9416874af756951908e43f5f9af260083d3bfec83
font_01_sfnt_off0001a42a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1A42A 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off0001bc41.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1BC41 10880 bytes
SHA-256: 413883e1410a0c02910a6b07e01818b3921c186a20a7de553f7441cb31d650ba