Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dc4e89eccdc8e35c…

MALICIOUS

RTF

401.7 KB Created: 2019-01-20 14:19:00 First seen: 2020-05-25
MD5: 69e6062e53f9f88122f0db39602ac0b1 SHA-1: 9f939ba64b952b301ced05e8cb52b631b7e54f73 SHA-256: dc4e89eccdc8e35cb4c2de908516944698041dcd4ab038ff949482cb6e3477f8
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation, specifically targeting CVE-2017-8759 via the Equation Editor. The presence of OLE object data and shellcode API strings within an extracted artifact suggests the file is designed to execute arbitrary code. This is a common method for delivering secondary payloads, hence the classification as a downloader.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00044de3.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x44DE3 8592 bytes
SHA-256: 67ff0449c56810ed91342d38f4bcc93b13e25946a55d6fed92fc2708e3e82c64
objdata_01_off000491b3.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x491B3 18443 bytes
SHA-256: 175df58d050cb3df69be03b69acfac5e5480ad6a5e2addeda2a2d35d91b4a4d4
objdata_02_off00055015.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x55015 17806 bytes
SHA-256: 4c8a18c46e318461d71869b776c701b9a7dddc9ddf2888b28c560ab7252055a8
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY, SC_STR_URLDOWNLOAD, SC_PEB_ACCESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryW, GetProcAddress, URLDownloadToFileW, ExitProcess

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