Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dc4c74f801b2e927…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

198.6 KB Created: 2020-12-29 16:16:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 5722bd3b0b68d03f587374b95263eb66 SHA-1: adfe8eb0a66a78ba6c78c7d4eefa5d4098d7324b SHA-256: dc4c74f801b2e92747732fddc486c75a162972ca9fe48dafae80aaad797f206e
69 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this OLE object is a risky file type, specifically a JAR archive, suggesting it is intended to deliver a secondary payload. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was not available for analysis, but the presence of the embedded executable artifact is a strong indicator of malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
40d2aea0113f7d7d48ae44b961f66de84d9023ca500194f86ceaf808b40098a6		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 189440 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
f9fac49696c2a72480ef2d11d4bb97932105c38847dabcb3758813b1fdf073c1		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 185609 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
82162fa21c933f61ff4be6bbd42c8ad3f5e236438dcf2b1eafe7dbdc942d9896		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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