Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dc4bdf0ff90254db…

MALICIOUS

PDF

96.3 KB Created: 2021-07-17 11:54:43 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 656de6092e97ddf228b0d8c3288b8640 SHA-1: fc315d1257885282de948ab52e322a8644dda7f2 SHA-256: dc4bdf0ff90254dba24cf4a34ff7cef0114c1fec2c3814c257f87e96f847c34e
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. The heuristics reveal it functions as a link farm, directing users to compromised WordPress uploads and disposable hosting sites, likely to host a second-stage payload. Notably, it contains a 'Clipboard command execution lure,' instructing users to copy and paste content into a shell, a common technique to trick users into executing malicious commands.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9936

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://petra-dario.info/upload/datoteke/sokimafebubidesevi.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://www.sunarnuricomuisvealisverismerkezi.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/sl7kq465p9329h0iuj81unaao6/tifuxat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://retentionstudentexperience.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607de4c5e447f---lesatufumaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://amartzon.store/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5cc2ea5dd745af278d5443667fcc8715/bijotiderasudoxajukixi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://newo.ru/files/files/59758790522.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://makaeximworld.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d9c14ca1a0c---95484263855.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fonixkoncert.hu/upload/file/sitelurigedole.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wych123.com/upload/files/29638589051.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mko-yug.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c60870f28db654205c5207410631626b/xumixediluburiwetenig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kamerton.nl/clientfiles/9876204680.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://adbetelparaguay.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d51c9d13a6cd16288e33987f4b0601ae/11657721894.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ta-taiwan.com/app/webroot/userfiles/files/niximavijupaped.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://loskutova.site/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/664901de67a1d0abb81baa215eb1c669/90528675209.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://school15-tyumen.ru/f/nejunepizazovadarenabado.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cecev.com/stockages/files/vuputekidebipuno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.etbsupplies.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bb12ff294a2---42793135653.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://chocolatycakes.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b6332f9a236---78966150225.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://amitadevnani.com/userfiles/file/54174178396.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://windcampus.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b988d1ad7f3---87406090814.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://primax.fr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/kchctp78hqubp90uqtntptuhb0/xetubomisero.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://haphadoor.com/upload/files/59483479492.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gbagencement.fr/uploads/file/forizarawe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://maspacientes.es/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/nd78pjnrbtk722ovobts3blp44/46076289174.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://asesoriagarpe.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a69d7f7c22d---pajemefirifezu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/PmAiG5ZyT-k/uplcv?utm_term=crawfish+time+moss+stPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001144c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1144C 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00012c5e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12C5E 18140 bytes
SHA-256: 852c1bc59f20672aa60574fcb7d39eac899dca284e73b2e0f954b479299e79a5
font_02_sfnt_off00015c47.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15C47 10448 bytes
SHA-256: 6c8101fa6fbcaa3b5fbb99f212eec7d3f7cc2f44e820a74b7ad667e67a9d650e

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