RTF malware analysis — malicious · dc2e7684f8c21142

MALICIOUS

RTF

113.0 KB First seen: 2024-10-06

MD5: 5ead5713e1263695bff52404264dd3b4 SHA-1: 19420de3c322f058f5c55d6c2a18cf27bd2ce856 SHA-256: dc2e7684f8c21142383906e061be62128064d2be6c8eb15c773eae3952615281

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object is automatically activated upon opening the document, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads, such as malware downloaders.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001d92.bin` `f91f993874b049770e488e466c81de288c715237e3dc36b14a862c9fcc48d022`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D92	1873 bytes

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