Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dc2351235725361c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.2 KB Created: 2021-02-21 09:50:48 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: 272a0d689b503271652357a4119975d1 SHA-1: e492f923d80509ee225e6997b35cf3f83cbda76a SHA-256: dc2351235725361c3c14f8b4375293b6ba556ec3779d17e81c84e8727298d824
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains a significant number of external links, identified as a link farm hosted on disposable domains and potentially malicious hosting. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or distributing further malware. The embedded URLs and the nature of the link farm suggest an attempt to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://bologen.ru/123?utm_term=did+brandon+burlsworth+die PDF link annotation
    • https://worozimovazez.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406108/solipinaxebide-juzagekozufa-mimeve.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kixarozikej/dfPyaia/jerava.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jirorenuges.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874518/4c386.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jidobimatu/geMzLqa/tijikitogesivamewovozekoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ritesevegozuvij.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606822/9420725.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/posiraki/dmluAIy/kushi_movie_theme_music_ringtone.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tororukiwuri/jeGrjjv/google_assistant_voice_shortcuts.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gamabisage.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681080/fejaxaduxiveba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://suxegetolikas.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134097713/lezuvidiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gegiritofizupog.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134644009/balagagav-fozenevafa-tixaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sukizasatesez.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134686833/9efb8fc7cd519b1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/bazexolareja/g5EhPmE/kpop_music_town_discount_code.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tabogivazosepa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871767/zaxotade-gozisifunifo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fereganew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134131887/kitazipar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/topipovikapari/56191560716.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bisapovepizaj/astm_d638_standard.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tawosutosuxi/litogalunatufor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xutulatovemi.epizy.com/walotasinozas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rubuvajaroxe.epizy.com/template_ppt_tumblr_free.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sesafefanulokam/the_chaser_movie.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nasedelowose.rf.gd/61448188.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/ruzumeb/demadixilawog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f36d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF36D 5144 bytes
SHA-256: 7ee829881c4766f30846554d5c8077448ea8fa637a5f04900c7921f7cdc5bafd
font_01_sfnt_off000104f2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x104F2 11192 bytes
SHA-256: d58713b958f1deea9db358417dddf56ab8494e0bb99812c335ca7019c79e7a5e

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