Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dbeac3ed65624e61…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

271.5 KB
MD5: 346040d0d23a6af420bbc27a9e75ad6c SHA-1: dc46c8ca70da32f5ff84fb124719051c55beb4f1 SHA-256: dbeac3ed65624e617c3c9c265dade3eba2279e489076f370fc617982870c2a56
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

This RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are designed to activate embedded content. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to enable macros or editing, a common tactic for malware droppers. The embedded OLE objects are the primary mechanism for delivering a malicious payload, likely by exploiting OLE activation features to execute arbitrary code.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000969.bin
bb3aae88d5a6a779706ea3959c0b30a5eb0859d589871dbd6e2509898b78b6be
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x969 41398 bytes
objdata_01_off00015a66.bin
9d9bc825f2fa5e0ed8db7dce6823e199ad9c775873472d42887214589f205470
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x15A66 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off00017009.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x17009 12297 bytes