Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dbc96f5fb21ef66e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

787.5 KB Created: 2018-04-18 01:57:00 First seen: 2019-05-10
MD5: 5663f496c57b04d44848c99484ea0749 SHA-1: a696267b1d5a55ba91ecd65aa9efbba18603a30d SHA-256: dbc96f5fb21ef66ecece09b9e640ffa7d884c167521dd1b6a22245c76a12a118
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple embedded OLE objects and triggers an OLE activation via \objupdate, which is a strong indicator of exploitation. The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-8759 confirms the exploitation of this specific vulnerability to achieve code execution. The embedded benign URL is not considered a malicious IOC.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 10 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 10

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002c28.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2C28 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 781fbada69c41badf44df0fdc7597ed464254c87f630bd170c4797f0e1e127b5
objdata_01_off000156da.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x156DA 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 29fd16ffa267d4405643a5b8515b8b2373fd27ea2ecd044d993278e2ebe02098
objdata_02_off0002818c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2818C 26683 bytes
SHA-256: b50158ab77f65f2dce59972a7a854db0bf2d6779a0009fbefece0d2433a2bcec
objdata_03_off0003ac3e.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3AC3E 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 6e2f62eb9dca2c2f3d47d7891269d9f47a8be3a518eb77529c9c43ba8a7ae293
objdata_04_off0004d6f0.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4D6F0 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 9bf32b01e1383a766fb5e0b7cf90b70655e9f19006eef8f70d9246891669ad79
objdata_05_off000601ee.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x601EE 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 5b5cd8e0311ac49548b639e0d3689174341d33820c032f6b0210d50d6093c644
objdata_06_off00072ca0.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x72CA0 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 75c1e6fa115bdb5e67275f0bafa40311bc2429039d7ed206f21f115f5bbfe218
objdata_07_off00085752.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x85752 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 2f39367f4582625ae2338ca4901c77b0b81fcc455e1eec1edde590b85b092df3
objdata_08_off00098204.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x98204 26683 bytes
SHA-256: bd9116711e5ee71a1d46fa5eff76c6283c709f9f3057e62183536f2527105c4e
objdata_09_off000aacb6.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAACB6 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 665c889b8cdf8bdae305a8ee6a8ad319f7994c07fd0116df31d6fce950527934