Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dbbe2d9d2fb32ccc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

209.7 KB Created: 2021-02-14 20:48:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 3133f67ca914d7afc2dbf02a300ccf30 SHA-1: 812cce152f89caba1a23e89f6d5663d047578635 SHA-256: dbbe2d9d2fb32cccf3b02b656f6377c9b2760149dad84aa291b8ef2fa468d72f
62 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this OLE object is a package carrying an executable or script file, specifically a JAR file. This suggests the document is designed to deliver a secondary payload. No specific URLs or scripts were extracted for further analysis, limiting the confidence in family attribution.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
ac385ee38a603e6a94549ef77b523129075e7834ac01ea98d93a0fa4579de5d1		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 199680 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
ac349f7b5ae26086122e179818594aabb1d464c112d2a34b887c43977d72ba5c		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 195234 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
2b71fe6816fe60177b3ba1c03ef905af43a0a7b08eae37c6044421b039c3126a		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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