Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 db9fbdc1b853c971…

MALICIOUS

PDF

91.6 KB Created: 2021-07-20 03:07:29 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 69ff60f138a8439bfd21dae367931f09 SHA-1: 293f3aead22cadd2dfafc06c335396442c38d4a1 SHA-256: db9fbdc1b853c9716ea1064b1646797235f1e40e9ecce82cbb0ac41a78acd726
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF was flagged by multiple heuristics, including a critical ClamAV detection for 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan'. The presence of a link farm on potentially compromised or disposable hosting, combined with the 'SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND' heuristic, suggests an attempt to redirect users to malicious sites. The 'SE_INVOICE_LURE' heuristic further indicates a phishing or scamming intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9937

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://benjamin1908.com/clients/f/f4/f4560e3fe432b95d15e234f900dec36a/File/zajidajepagexikedutibilu.pdf
    • http://asesorgubernamental.com/images/file/75599180603.pdf
    • https://gccpay.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/96e7616441abf0ae669a47cb84a38f3a/tunamesidat.pdf
    • http://pogservice.ru/userfiles/file/zavodiwimuporubaw.pdf
    • http://tykhestudiodesigns.com/clients/7/73/7311521ca682816632878891c231d107/File/79728451635.pdf
    • https://underworldgear.com/upload/users/files/tefelapazupiboxum.pdf
    • http://xn--90ad5ackt1d.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8bc0f83b927013b9d58453c4c47e701c/rugijukazixekese.pdf
    • http://wksystems.net/HotelEstimator/userfiles/file/lafebinasakowofegom.pdf
    • http://www.liveartsaskatchewan.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a60f5b095a0---bejejokumovemodo.pdf
    • https://salubrismd.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/678170f5b16e4a73b6b251180a4b656a/kenol.pdf
    • https://centar-znr-zop.hr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16098755f63d94---jekakela.pdf
    • http://angelojrobles.com/admin_initial_test/userfiles/file/nisunopikek.pdf
    • http://benhvienlaptop.biz/userfiles/file/nujavaweposibetuga.pdf
    • http://www.telsercom.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607e020220d28---viledosoxidegow.pdf
    • http://www.theflightfest.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608aca4b4850a---11721111962.pdf
    • https://simovi.mx/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16095dfdc05732---bavokibominubomeviji.pdf
    • https://atolab.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2e78ac27e66623486fa4acd884a20625/42356714895.pdf
    • http://teusz.pl/UserFiles/file/95456010830.pdf
    • http://charmingcurls.se/upload/file/bowetuweferifogek.pdf
    • http://slanfusa.org/clients/47225/File/50099246255.pdf
    • http://omatsuri.kr/data/userfiles/files/retafinu.pdf
    • https://www.medipratik.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16095bbd432799---nibalixabepum.pdf
    • http://birons.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/557678dcfd77d0c3b50bbe9c0a21e7ba/20482256089.pdf
    • https://micast.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/kjldeh9pfpp959jco0v0gtre98/57096175490.pdf
    • http://slanfusa.o
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/FevRqgeaUVY/uplcv?utm_term=cash+flow+example+problems+and+solutions
    • http://kioskcondoweb.wpengine.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b2294d085f9---wefegoz.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000103e9.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x103E9 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011bfb.bin
4dbffa3fd990f87ac2492f4e75125682cd50907fe1e32b7e64ec089ebe36fb5d
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11BFB 16584 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001470c.bin
48795deacb96421ee450e49b58eb632b6e1c08785730f1f760a2084726531721
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1470C 11220 bytes