Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 db676a254566dd1a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.1 KB Created: 2021-09-18 00:47:02 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: f697f12331cf6591bf4326a6aa9d08f0 SHA-1: 6ec03d62484e248cf4700ef7a8fd312c146dc490 SHA-256: db676a254566dd1a35d36b3e789ea7439bd8e28d5376c0f066568b5882bbbb5b
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many pointing to disposable domains or compromised WordPress sites, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the nature of the URLs and the PDF structure align with common phishing lures.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9953

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://infrive.ru/uplcv?utm_term=demon+slayer+season+2+episode+1+eng+sub
    • https://www.displaysdirectaustralia.com.au/application/third_party/ckfinder/userfiles/files/98132244567.pdf
    • http://xn--b1afklwjc5g.xn--p1ai/ckfinder/userfiles/files/tugagegaxulubukefoxakazu.pdf
    • http://greece-ex.com/images/blog/file/77270241070.pdf
    • http://agnieszkapawlik.com/userfiles/file/59080385958.pdf
    • http://www.luna1956.com/images/library/File/29011390637.pdf
    • http://isystemlab.com/admin/ckfinder/userfiles/files/73452897548.pdf
    • https://pieseautocomenzi.ro/userfiles/file/1044454913.pdf
    • https://textosolutionslinguistiques.ca/upload/editor/file/87498810602.pdf
    • http://kapelski.pl/userfiles/file/natowiginepelilope.pdf
    • https://alenakovalchuk.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/249a9276707f2a61d9d36273b168bcc3/26466660340.pdf
    • http://zatexpress.com/upload/userfiles/files/dewexota.pdf
    • https://truongthanhco.vn/webroot/img/files/zeworofezusutafokapure.pdf
    • https://ddriu.hu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0b609c6a7a9e06f56f62912a34a60814/76923842286.pdf
    • https://rachelrom.com/rescontent/file/jorobexe.pdf
    • http://infas.cz/images/wiswig/file/30530744734.pdf
    • http://zadonskiy.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613edeb2c80d5---21617958712.pdf
    • https://h1t-url12shio-turbo.com/contents/files/xewovelegejivifawevunevif.pdf
    • https://pmfegypt.com/userfiles/files/bukaroramidow.pdf
    • http://www.sudaff.com/pics/file/53865499026.pdf
    • http://nusratali.com/userfiles/files/kimulewogaxizoxuwixawuwi.pdf
    • http://ildongwire.com/userfiles/file/livojulijukutaxo.pdf
    • http://cx-gl.hu/images/files/63201731505.pdf
    • http://andlupa.com/userfiles/file/raxasunobalol.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b650.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB650 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000ce62.bin
6ecc7b9d38e7ffd9e25745d18201fc69a8f7f04af1c6e9da3cdb0c86caf228f8		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCE62 19940 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00010180.bin
4f0f95f38f3cd365c7aa66346101d3abb051744229025fdf60e571ca3cf490d2		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10180 11164 bytes

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