Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 db5af353dd553d39…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

222.0 KB Created: 2020-12-17 14:30:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: d4183f1184f52c434eac6d3821e7b48d SHA-1: a5b80322629fac68765016a4dbd3447b62f9e252 SHA-256: db5af353dd553d39566d4f43115cece2840677af2aa291a412152848988517c4
64 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. This object, identified as a risky file package (jar extension), strongly suggests an attempt to deliver a malicious payload. The presence of this embedded artifact is the primary indicator of malicious intent. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was not available for analysis.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
9c515cadf81a9b246ab7f06f61a3875e536055f52b4e61dc154c4ce06eae3d01		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 211968 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
e774927b5b3765da2fae5dadda18de64a9c5fa65cdf46d21b679aa6136f5ad19		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 207596 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
cf47dadac14b4d061871846f10cea92e32f1685b774d0f62ff9b11108d7696d9		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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