Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 db50cb0b458d1a06…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

26.2 KB First seen: 2022-12-15
MD5: 438bb1028f6dd84e25367c7b7b9b9915 SHA-1: 66abbaa76e3984ef774613a3877f76688f1878cf SHA-256: db50cb0b458d1a060715cf4f03983a7d5a6352b15c4970949b955b2daabc0158
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with an Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit vector. The document also includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', indicating an attempt to bypass security measures and execute embedded content. The presence of these elements suggests the file is designed to exploit vulnerabilities upon opening.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004ef0.bin
929192e5938bae5a92d21c6947d533566c6fe8c8566a514f2e6e33b1b9b4e399
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4EF0 1844 bytes