RTF malware analysis — malicious · db4fed8fb3c35582

MALICIOUS

RTF

84.0 KB First seen: 2024-07-26

MD5: e03f3290788de4d7a103f16b780b3cce SHA-1: c220e79a2714ed59f4d7b1d0a4f6c63a03772ea6 SHA-256: db4fed8fb3c35582ade2fa57a5866ec7795e94bff34f004f66d15233d1a2fcd8

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File: Malicious Code

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object is automatically activated upon opening the document, which is a common technique for exploiting client-side vulnerabilities. This likely leads to the download and execution of a secondary malicious payload.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000014b3.bin` `d01b35743abe8ed593116a2c43719133a71e98588efb2db94ab41db46d25eb2f`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x14B3	1705 bytes

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