Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 db3dc64666dd926d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1.07 MB Created: 2017-09-19 09:01:37 -07:00 Authoring application: Microsoft® Word 2016
MD5: 410adade2c037d63739fc19923a63767 SHA-1: 70d7899d836188d3248af971f44751c0a0e0f78d SHA-256: db3dc64666dd926d0103fa637e2770e8a57bada6eb551550f9863788141db86c
490 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a launch action that executes cmd.exe. The command execution is designed to download and run a second-stage payload, identified as 'stream_032_off0010e5d6.bin'. The PDF also exhibits characteristics related to CVE-2023-26369 and uses parser evasion techniques, indicating a sophisticated attack. The presence of a PE payload within the PDF stream further confirms its malicious intent.

Heuristics 15

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
    PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\Security_Guide.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Visible LOLBin command execution instruction high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Document contains instructions or visible command text involving Windows script/execution tools such as PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, or regsvr32
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • PDF differential parser failed info PDF_DIFFERENTIAL_PARSE_FAILED
    The cross-check parser (pdfminer.six) failed on this file: PDF differential parser exited 1. Static heuristics still ran and any of their findings above are valid; only the differential cross-check signal is missing.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://github.com/PowerShell/JEA
    • http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/default.aspx
    • https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/mt130644.aspx
    • http://aka.ms/privsec
    • https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/privileged-access-workstations
    • https://mva.microsoft.com/
    • https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-server-update-services/get-started/windows-server-update-services-wsus
    • http://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sccm/sum/understand/software-updates-introduction
    • https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/operations-management-suite/oms-solution-update-management
    • https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=55319
    • https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/secguide/
    • http://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/system-center/dpm/dpm-overview
    • http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=55269
    • http://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/suites/operations-management-suite/
    • http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/dn785092.aspx
    • http://aka.ms/laps
    • http://aka.ms/JEAdocs
    • http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn896648.aspx
    • http://channel9.msdn.com/Blogs/windowsserver/Just-Enough-and-Just-in-Time-Administration-in-Windows-Server-2016
    • http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=46899
    • https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-platform/microsoft-identity-manager
    • http://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/advanced-threat-analytics/
    • http://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/advanced-threat-analytics/understand-explore/ata-threats
    • http://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/access-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard
    • https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/access-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard
    • http://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/access-protection/remote-credential-guard
    • http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/mt637065\(v=vs.85\).aspx
    • http://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/windows-defender/windows-defender-overview-windows-server
    • http://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/device-security/device-guard/device-guard-deployment-guide
    • http://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/device-security/applocker/applocker-overview
    • http://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/secure-boot-overview
    • https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/WindowsForBusiness/windows-atp
    • http://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-10-version-1507-and-1511
    • http://aka.ms/shieldedvms
    • http://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/networking/sdn/software-defined-networking
    • http://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/networking/sdn/technologies/network-function-virtualization/datacenter-firewall-overview
    • http://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/networking/sdn/manage/configure-datacenter-firewall-acls
    • http://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/networking/sdn/manage/use-acls-for-traffic-flow
    • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=366l9ZLRVBw&list=PL8nfc9haGeb4hLnZzWclNNFe-IfLiy57U&index=11
    • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xip5Qtk-7d8&index=15&list=PL8nfc9haGeb7C9h0mejs_4-OeNeT-y7Ct&t=13s
    • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xnBrbkY9P20&index=6&list=PL8nfc9haGeb7C9h0mejs_4-OeNeT-y7Ct&t=3s
    • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eUpKOGSl7yk&index=3&list=PL8nfc9haGeb7C9h0mejs_4-OeNeT-y7Ct
    • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F-pTkesjkhI&index=5&list=PL8nfc9haGeb7C9h0mejs_4-OeNeT-y7Ct
    • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RAS-TI6PUrg
    • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_SaDw1dRy2k&index=7&list=PL8nfc9haGeb7C9h0mejs_4-OeNeT-y7Ct&t=5s
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj1100_000.js
74d09c95fb77349191080f1da810a1010767ea1f8714e2aff4f4d58f81fa6abe
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1100 at offset 0x111991 63 bytes
stream_018_off0002c5cf.bin
920abbc593f54e04cab4781211918019be9113c5bbffc043e529834bfe576b8f
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x2C5CF 258112 bytes
stream_022_off000332bc.bin
c6e6cc303c660fbcab459ce45b4d8637203e4f27e5ec14f69d43c372eb4255d6
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x332BC 420580 bytes
stream_023_off00061df6.bin
2ef29de90f42c650b635e429b38b1f94f9bbc9f009e23026a71a25a1e33ae580
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x61DF6 438176 bytes
stream_026_off0009d9ac.bin
1b70f4632803ba6ff0e403ed7e691cc80a034957990a12689a67710b17d46ca1
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x9D9AC 358204 bytes
stream_032_off0010e5d6.bin
7421ea2eea02abcb207672d105f8c5058734f845c413706326a7965d06ff52e5
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x10E5D6 39743 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains a PowerShell -EncodedCommand style payload.