Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dac32d65d2a7fce6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.9 KB Created: 2021-02-18 10:19:12 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 788320e80d31cc042bce043ef54becb6 SHA-1: d12ab9f25de1c71889b5a9b2779c42deac35c814 SHA-256: dac32d65d2a7fce60171f060bd64407d823ff8d859bc66f318945e2dc81b03a3
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a mass of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to distribute malicious content or facilitate phishing. The heuristic 'SE_INVOICE_LURE' indicates the document's content is designed to mimic a payment request. While no scripts were extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external links strongly suggest it's part of a phishing or malware distribution campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://maypoin.ru/wix?keyword=hillsborough+county+florida+business+tax+receipt PDF link annotation
    • https://kokubuzo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134017800/370035.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kaxagigunuji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383746/bujuzik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gidufulelav/Z7ARXja/melasumuzosezibanuluz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/busoleva/0109eGq/pixel_art_survival_games_pc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://montana-media.com/bijli_song_tamil3kdem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://digitalmicroteter.xyz/recon-_ng_tutorialwmuk9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://demuvejujewik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134042515/guzorixawimajip-xotanuvep-sariwix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pedulexonevexo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740508/1271438.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fexalikinuzumow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135324316/e9c2d027fb62135.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sifajovu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134874608/8732362.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zadoweferoxe/jjegjBP/mini_warriors_2_how_to_upgrade_gear.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sobuxiba.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134867950/1941666.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lovomijelun/boy_scouts_family_life_merit_badge_workbook.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/farezelof/xaput.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/muwemivumazulax/rakojikus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000eb17.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEB17 5688 bytes
SHA-256: fe16665982e216544fb79f845860660521f2aaee7057f9bd9b434e212ff1d3b7
font_01_sfnt_off0000fe6c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE6C 12168 bytes
SHA-256: 31bb46e7ddd78101454b4537cd0db16c6ab9574f4ef24f861dcd3e42cb19c165

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