Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dab0ec1a191f2b02…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.80 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: b9d7fa5f1766428ebf0ea91b197dc7ee SHA-1: 5162e7f958a5d391fe6c105fbdf64e1106ed3f89 SHA-256: dab0ec1a191f2b028267648f4686a2069fb492ab1396a013f216617ee312c313
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759). This indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability for client-side code execution. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics further supports the exploitation of OLE object activation mechanisms. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, preventing further analysis of the payload's intent.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off001b2d6f.bin
1f240db5b54167abb0ef0bb5c18ed794a85b53f54e3d247ebb6f9d4318fff675		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1B2D6F 3732 bytes

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