Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 daad529bc49c0b2e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.1 KB Created: 2021-01-21 01:42:52 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-04-10
MD5: 5b8489df3ac1f2818cc2c39ff4fb41c8 SHA-1: cb6a4df05fd9566d6cdaeb0b26f084add934bb74 SHA-256: daad529bc49c0b2e5f910f64c61e2555b758aa5112def2566d43b96142b9748e
244 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/123?utm_term=first+day+of+school+2015+ontario In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4382187/normal_5f8cbe7d00d41.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4393020/normal_5f9ecae3228bc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1216718.mozfiles.com/files/1216718/92766416954.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zevijilutijeso.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134850931/ferinama-nixijog-puzivolis-zifuzeronux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pudorexejuvaw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131455832/40d90d48.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dosodufixelo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682620/xolel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xonasuxodu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681295/9587592.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4424013/normal_5fe2a0350c3e8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1249658.mozfiles.com/files/1249658/serilizamesemusel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1194286.mozfiles.com/files/1194286/mutazakabajamugev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wixinuwexe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739185/ninerobidewif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gigawixirebasig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857482/tiwefibizakoxu_xovupusaxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fewanisip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712603/666a6d8566.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1198426.mozfiles.com/files/1198426/breaking_into_wall_street_course.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jusodizepo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070216/cf026c84d9db.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365525/normal_5f926619e7c4e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dofetavazazu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131071127/355865bc1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://polokoxukoneg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132816042/1272ebe4a8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000db6b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDB6B 5616 bytes
SHA-256: 36be6b93746441fddbebe1bac88b6bf96ce6e7686cdd047e229c9d15b8d58b48
font_01_sfnt_off0000ee96.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE96 10740 bytes
SHA-256: 0ab819f6592dca5fcef0e95b166831ffac53c3b767e9bc9e82c38e2a15f4738c

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