RTF malware analysis — malicious · da9e775854e2b7d5

MALICIOUS

RTF

43.3 KB First seen: 2023-07-24

MD5: 48a074a5009cc07ede6b9107898630fc SHA-1: b872c303b963eed76ab2300e0d6accb10954e0f2 SHA-256: da9e775854e2b7d59208e61327f77b16f63c33be746a47e464670192fd8beb38

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains an OLE object and specifically targets the Equation Editor, a known vector for exploits. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, a common tactic to bypass security measures. This suggests the file is designed to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00005c3a.bin` `52f928d85f458c3a0fbb17c92e0254624586346c9c0f4e55302314b1b1890908`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x5C3A	1505 bytes

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