Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 da9316940e4c4748…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.8 KB
MD5: 230c2fc5c85a2826b02c8f761276d113 SHA-1: 3a84fd879c95473eb9af1b6e88d12b8eda0f1226 SHA-256: da9316940e4c4748248cca1aee184f9848cc63faef2cd7bb1bb5e4ef180dc424
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of \objupdate further indicates an attempt to force OLE object activation, likely leading to arbitrary code execution. The document body contains only a numerical string, providing no further context for the lure.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000cb.bin
fbffa5a0f99c6d15ee3a709d0ecda8bee2681af4a579fdb89878c6aac6cd8cf3
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xCB 2150 bytes