Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 da7413c919a10583…

MALICIOUS

PDF

11.6 KB
MD5: 782a81dafaf3f327792442ceb8d1084f SHA-1: 35b516a57f4bef599acb2b363e974c816cc4a3ad SHA-256: da7413c919a1058304f01a1c50eb4c4c2f21abb525ae53be44b0f85c67d5510c
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, specifically leveraging the CVE-2007-5659 vulnerability through the Collab.collectEmailInfo method. This technique is used to decode and execute a hex-encoded stager, which is then further deobfuscated. The primary function appears to be the execution of malicious code, as indicated by the ClamAV detection and the nature of the exploit.

Heuristics 7

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063
  • Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN
    PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0007_000.js
eb39e2de4dbbc100de6d3e30aa43ff78fa075618862ba1ebba5151ea3a3b848d
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19D 273 bytes
annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js
397a191f7d97ebe07a6b9256bf02eb08e06858fe6e1aa782df69f4dcc61d0f84
deobfuscated-js annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A 4914 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
deobfuscated.js
7b3d392b56286c34ef650bf9c90fc41df24cda2d251970da68f6f44283ff0543
deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 73933 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).